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ABSTRACT
A New Approach to Estimate the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
by
Harold Ayatollah Va´squez-Ru´ız
April 2012
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics
After Harberger published his influential paper in 1962, many authors have assessed em-
pirically whether the incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) falls on capital owners,
consumers, or workers (Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963; Gordon, 1967; Arulampalam
et al., 2008). Today, there is little agreement among economists about who bears the inci-
dence of the CIT (Gruber, 2007; Harberger, 2008a,b). The reason for the little convincing
evidence is that the econometric models used in the literature ignore that the factors
that motivate changes in corporate tax policy are sometimes correlated with other devel-
opments in the economy and disentangling those effects from exogenous policy changes
requires tremendous effort.
Using annual information at the industry level for the United States, I propose to
investigate the consequences of exogenous changes in corporate tax policy. The identifi-
cation of these exogenous events follows the work of Romer and Romer (2009, 2010), who
provide an extensive analysis of the U.S. federal tax legislation using narrative records
from presidential speeches and congressional reports, among other documentations. The
v
results validate the original predictions from Harberger (1995, 2008a). That is, in the
short-term, capital owners bear the full burden of the tax. Over time, however, capital
owners are able to shift this burden either by raising consumers’ goods prices, or de-
creasing workers’ wages. The magnitude of these effects depends on the degree of capital
intensity as well as the access to international markets and the availability of substitutes
for the industry under consideration.
vi
CHAPTER I
Motivation
“Only People—Not Goods or Organizations—Can Bear the Burden
of a Tax.”
After Harberger published his influential paper in 1962, many authors have assessed
empirically whether the incidence of the corporate income tax (henceforth CIT) falls on
capital owners, consumers, or workers (Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963; Gordon, 1967;
Arulampalam et al., 2008).1 Even today, there is little agreement among economists
about who bears the incidence of the CIT (Gruber, 2007; Harberger, 2008a,b). The
reason for the little convincing evidence on who bears the burden of this tax is that
the econometric models used in the literature are not able to account for the different
reasons that motivate corporate tax changes. That is, the factors that motivate changes
in corporate tax policy are sometimes correlated with other developments in the economy
(e.g., financing healthcare reform), and disentangling those effects from exogenous policy
1Before advancing any further, it is important to clarify a few concepts. Economists use tax incidence
analysis to identify how the burden of a tax is distributed across individuals. In this sense, the literature
identifies two incidence measures: (i) statutory incidence, which measures incidence in terms of who
actually paid—i.e., according to the law—the tax; and (ii) economic incidence, which considers the
combined effect of statutory incidence and how real income responds to changes in goods and factor
prices when a tax is imposed. These two measures will differ in the presence of tax shifting. Tax shifting
occurs whenever some individuals—e.g., in this case corporations–can transfer the burden of the taxes
they are supposed to pay through changes in factor rewards and prices (Bruce, 2001, p. 325-26). This
study focuses on the economic incidence—henceforth referred only as incidence—of the corporate income
tax, unless otherwise specified.
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changes requires tremendous effort. In addition, the empirical literature is mostly based
on a single-point estimate, or short-run elasticity, of the effect of a tax change on the price
of consumer goods and the price of production factors: labor and capital, neglecting the
issue of timing and the long term effects.
Most importantly, the empirical literature thus far has ignored that the incidence of
a change in the CIT, as predicted in Harberger’s model, occurs over time—as investors
move some part of the capital stock immediately and the other part just gradually (see
Auerbach, 2006, p. 10). Therefore the effect of the CIT on prices will also depend on the
short- and long-term ability of capital owners to escape taxation.
To consider an example on how the dynamics of corporate tax changes might work,
suppose that the U.S. government decides to impose a tax on the income of oil extracting
companies to cover for potential environmental damages from industrial accidents. The
initial, or short-term, effect of the tax will be to reduce the profits of oil corporations,
harming corporations’ owners and stockholders. Over time, as oil extraction becomes
less profitable, investors move their capital to other sectors, or countries, where they can
obtain a higher return, thus escaping the tax. As less capital is available to build new oil
rigs, the industry’s supply of oil and demand for workers decline. Therefore, in the long-
term, the CIT would result in higher gas prices and lower wages—affecting consumers
and workers, economy-wide.
The previous example summarizes the intuition behind Harberger’s contribution. Nev-
ertheless, a set of assumptions about production functions and the elasticities of product
demands and factor substitutions are required in order to determine the true incidence of
the CIT. Following this path, general equilibrium (GE) models have been developed since
the 1980’s, in which economists simulate the tax-expenditure system of a real economy (or
group of economies) to analyze how policy changes affect individuals’ income and welfare.
However, as Harberger indicates, the modeling and calibration to the economy analyzed
“must be of high quality,” and given the disagreement about the main parameters that
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must be chosen, this constitutes a challenging task. Moreover, these models might not be
measuring only the incidence of the CIT, but that of the “entire tax system,” making the
incidence analysis unintelligible (Harberger, 2008a, p. 285-86). As of today, the general
equilibrium modeling literature is inconclusive regarding who bears the incidence of the
corporate income tax.2
The importance of determining the incidence of the CIT is twofold. For equity consid-
erations, the assumptions on the incidence of the corporate tax have crucial implications
when policy makers evaluate the progressivity of the tax system. For instance, in a 2007
report entitled “Historical Effective Federal Tax Rates: 1979 to 2005,” the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) showed that the corporate income tax—and the U.S. tax system
overall—is moderately progressive. However these calculations rely on the assumption
that “corporate income taxes are borne [fully] by owners of capital” (CBO, 2007, p. 3).
Thus, in the opposite case that the burden of the CIT is borne by consumers or workers,
the CBO’s conclusions will overstate the progressivity of the national tax system.3
On efficiency grounds, the CIT always occupies an important place when policy makers
are discussing the introduction of a tax reform. For instance, in a recent article Michael
Boskin points to the role the CIT has in promoting efficiency and economic growth: “re-
ducing or eliminating the corporate tax would curtail numerous wasteful tax distortions,
boost growth in both the short and long run, increase America’s global competitiveness,
and raise future wages” (Boskin, 2010). Yet this assertion supposes that for an open
economy with free mobility of capital, the CIT might reduce the reward for investments,
2To cite few examples, Gravelle and Smetters (2006) use an open economy general equilibrium model,
calibrated for the U.S. economy and the rest of the world, and claim that capital owners bears the full
burden of the CIT. In Harberger’s view, however, some of the “key” parameters used for the calibration
are “quite implausible” (Harberger, 2008a, p. 306). On the other hand, Gentry (2007) conducted a review
of the open economy GE model literature and concludes that labor and land—as production factors of
less mobility—bear the burden of this tax.
3The CBO argument about the progressivity of the CIT is based on estimations of effective tax
rates—the ratio of tax liability to income—for each quintile of the income distribution of the population.
According to these calculations, in 2005 the lowest quintile of the income distribution has an effective
tax rate of 0.4%. This rate increases progressively to 0.5% for the second, 0.7% for the middle, 1.0% for
the fourth, and 4.9% for the highest quintile of the income distribution (see CBO, 2007, Table 1).
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and its long-term incidence is borne by workers. Kotlikoff and Miao (2010) investigate
how the corporate income tax affects the level of business risk in the economy. In this
model, entrepreneurs can choose to declare their firms as one of two types: (i) corporate
and (ii) private. The former are allowed to trade publicly in capital markets, while for
the later public trading is banned. The access to capital markets permits corporate firms
to diversify their asset portfolio, thus reducing their level of risk. However, these corpo-
rations are subject to the CIT.4 Using a simple model in which production depends on
labor and managerial skills, they show that the CIT reduces the amount of publicly traded
companies on behalf of private entities, thus increasing the level of risk in the economy.
To empirically determine the incidence of the CIT (and perhaps the reason why pre-
vious attempts might have failed), it is necessary to obtain time series information on
exogenous changes in policy that allows for the estimation of the short- and long-term
effects of tax changes on the price of goods and services produced as well as the price of
production factors: rate of return on capital and wage rate.5 In the words of Harberger
(2008a), however, this could be a challenging task given that “the world never gives us a
clear incidence scenario in which we can trace out the consequences of a tax change by
simply following the data” (p. 305). Facing to this challenging task, and I think successful,
constitutes this research’s major contribution.
To get there, I employ a new and more appropriate methodology that allows for a
clearer improved analysis for how the incidence of the CIT is distributed over time among
workers, consumers, and capital owners. Using annual information at the industry level
for the United States, I investigate the consequences of exogenous changes in corporate tax
4The U.S. tax code makes a similar distinction when classifies corporations as “C-corporations” and “S-
corporations”—the letters “C” and “S” refer to the corresponding chapters in the legislation. The profits
from C-corporations are subject to the corporate income tax. Moreover, dividends from C-corporations
are taxed at the individual level when they are distributed to investors. On the other hand, S-corporations
do not pay the CIT. Instead, their profits are taxed under the individual income tax when they are
distributed among shareholders.
5In Harberger’s model, land rent prices are positively with the imposition of the corporate income
tax. However, as I will explain in section 2.1.2, the increase in land rent prices is only to compensate for
the increasing profits in the Agriculture sector caused by a decline in labor cost.
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policy. The identification of these exogenous events are based on the work of Romer and
Romer (2009, 2010), who provide an extensive analysis of the U.S. federal tax legislation
using narrative records from presidential speeches and congressional reports, among other
documentations. That is, by looking at the sources that motivate tax policy changes, this
study separates exogenous events in corporate tax policy from other endogenous develop-
ments within the economy and, therefore, it obtains a “clean” unconfounded estimate of
the incidence of the corporation income tax.
The estimation procedure uses Vector Autoregression (VAR) models. As chapter
III explains in more detail, the advantages of using a VAR approach are as follows.
First, the VAR specification assumes that all the variables in the system of equations
are endogenous, thus solving the simultaneity problem that arises in the literature when
estimating factor returns as functions of the CIT. Second, the impulse-response functions
(IRF) obtained from the VAR system allow for the dynamic impact analysis of exogenous
shocks associated with corporate income tax policy. These dynamic responses tie the short
and long run reactions of prices to policy changes in a smooth function that enhances the
interpretation of the results. Third, this technique allows to analyze simultaneously the
impact of CIT changes on capital owners, consumers, and workers, which represent a big
depart from the previous empirical literature which only focus on the effect of corporate
tax changes on one of these three groups (Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963; Arulampalam
et al., 2008; Felix, 2007; Nadja Dwenger and Steiner, 2011).6
The results validate the original predictions from Harberger (1995, 2008a,b) on the
effect of an exogenous increase of the corporate income tax for a multi-sector open econ-
omy. That is, in the short-term, the CIT rises the cost of capital in the corporate sector,
thus capital owners bear the full burden of the tax. Over time, as capital re-allocates in
the economy, the cost of capital returns to its pre-tax level and the return to capital in the
6In section 2.2.3, I present a detailed critique on the empirical literature from its origins until current
time.
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non-corporate sector (e.g., Agriculture, Services) declines. The tax-wedge created by the
CIT is absorbed by workers with the outcome that wages decline almost economy-wide.
Finally, the estimations show that in the long-term the CIT changes result in the rise
of prices of goods and services in high capital intensive industries (e.g., Transportation
& Utilities, Manufacturing). For sectors with a relative low capital income share (e.g.,
Services) prices decline.
6
CHAPTER II
Literature Review
2.1 The Harberger model: 45 years of tax incidence analysis
The formal treatment of tax incidence analysis began with Harberger (1962) seminal
contribution. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the dissection of the effects
of corporate income tax (CIT) changes and derives some inference about the incidence of
this tax. Harberger characterizes a two-sector competitive closed economy, divided into
corporate (C) and noncorporate (NC) sectors, where each sector produces a unique good
employing labor (L) and capital (K) as factors of production. These factors are fixed
in total supply to the economy but both are perfectly mobile across sectors. Harberger
introduces the CIT as a partial factor tax, i.e., a tax on the earnings of capital in the C
sector, on the top of the personal income tax, but not the earnings from the NC sector.
He also assumes that the government spends all CIT proceeds in a way that will just
counterbalance the reduction in consumption from individuals. When analyzing a CIT
change, Harberger considers the long-run effects to be of “greatest theoretical and practical
interest,” therefore his model does not focus on the short-term effects of CIT changes.
However, Harberger argues that under perfect competition the short-term incidence of the
CIT will be “borne out of the earnings of fixed capital equipment in the affected industry”
(Harberger, 1962, p. 215), hence capital owners will bear the short-term incidence of this
7
tax.
Under some standard assumptions for the elasticity of output and factor substitution,
this model shows how the incidence of the CIT falls on all capital income, economy-wide,
but not only on capital income from the taxed sector. Intuitively, the CIT reduces the
rate of return on capital (r) in the C sector, causing investors to move capital to the
NC (non-taxed) sector, as factors are perfectly mobile (factor substitution effect). The
movement of capital increases the labor to capital (L/K) ratio in the C sector and reduces
this ratio in the NC sector, changing the relative return to both factors. The capital stock
will continue to flow from the C to the NC sector until the economy-wide rate of return
on capital falls enough, relative to the wage rate (w), so that the net-of-tax rates of return
across the two sectors is the same. Therefore, the factor substitution effect unambiguously
decreases the factor price ratio r/w, worsening capital owners relative to workers.
The CIT also increases the gross-of-tax rate of return to capital, raising the cost of
capital to firms in the C sector. This causes the price for the corporate good to increase
relative to the noncorporate good and consumers to demand more products from the
NC sector. Hence, output in the C sector declines while output in the NC sector rises
(output substitution effect). The decrease and increase in output from the corporate
and noncorporate sectors, respectively, will affect the r/w ratio depending on whether
the corporate sector is labor or capital intensive, compared to the noncorporate. When
the C sector is labor intensive, the reallocation of labor and capital from the C to the
NC sector causes the r/w ratio to raise because the L/K ratio released from C firms is
significantly higher than the L/K ratio employed in NC—which is capital intensive, hence
the excess supply of labor relative to capital causes w to fall economy-wide. On the other
hand, when the C sector is more capital intensive than the NC sector, the r/w ratio will
decline, as the ratio of L/K released from C is smaller than the L/K ratio actually used
in the NC sector. That is, labor becomes more scarce, relative to capital, and its price
w rises. Therefore, the output substitution effect makes the incidence of the CIT fall in
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capital owners or workers depending on whether the C sector is capital or labor intensive,
respectively.
Overall, the effect of the CIT on factor prices depends on whether the corporate
sector is capital or labor intensive. If the C sector is capital intensive, then both the
factor substitution and output substitution effects unambiguously reduce the r/w ratio,
hence capital owners bear more of the tax burden compared to workers. Contrarily, if
the C sector is labor intensive, then the factor substitution effect works in the opposite
direction to the output substitution effect, and the net effect on the r/w ratio depends on
the capacity of the factor substitution effect to overcome the output substitution effect.
This model is not only important for its sophistication and rigor for tax incidence
analysis but also it removed the wide-spread misconception that corporate taxes were
fully shifted to consumers in the form of higher goods prices (Krzyzaniak and Musgrave,
1963; Gillis, 2008). Using observed values of capital and labor shares for the period 1953-
55, Harberger (1962) found the U.S. corporate sector to be more labor intensive than the
noncorporate sector. Then, he calibrated the model with plausible parameter assumptions
for the elasticity of product and factor substitution and consistently showed that capital
owners bear about 100% of the incidence of the corporate income tax.
2.1.1 Harberger extensions: (i) the open economy case
To extend the incidence analysis of a CIT change for a two-sector open economy, again
divided into corporate (C) and noncorporate (NC) sectors, Harberger (2008a) assumes
that one of these sectors has access to trade goods and services in world markets, tradable
(T) sector, while the other sells its products in the local market, nontradable (NT) sector.
Also, the open economy assumption implies that the net-of-tax rate of return to capital
r and the price of tradable goods are both determined in world markets. The fact that
r is determined worldwide does not eliminate the possibility of small differences across
countries in the net rate of return to capital due to differences in country risk perceptions.
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However, Harberger argues that one country’s change in the CIT rate will not affect its
risk premium and, therefore, the cross-country net rate of return to capital will remain the
same as the levels prior the policy change (Harberger, 1980, 2008b). These assumptions
are enough to show that all workers and consumers of nontradable products will bear the
incidence of the corporation tax.
To work conceptually through this model, first, assume a world with no CIT and for
our two-sector open economy suppose the noncorporate sector is tradable (NC-T) while
the corporate sector is nontradable (C-NT). Then, the imposition of a CIT will affect
neither the price of capital nor will it affect the price of noncorporate products, since
both are determined worldwide. Also, it can be shown that the price of labor, economy-
wide, will remain unchanged as well. Therefore, the price of the C-NT goods and services
will have to raise and consumers of C products will bear the incidence of this tax.1
When the corporate sector is tradable C-T, the CIT will not affect the net rate of return
to capital, nor the world price for the corporate tradable goods, therefore corporations
will stay in business if only if they can shift the tax burden to workers, hence wages in
the C-T sector will decline until they absorb the full amount of the tax. Since wages
must be equalized economy-wide, Harberger (2008a) showed that workers end up bearing
more than 100% of the burden of the tax. Furthermore, the drop in wages will cause a
reduction in the price of the NC nontradable goods and services, benefiting the buyers of
these products. In other words, capital owners and workers will receive a gain from the
CIT but only in their roles as consumers of NC nontradable products.2
1Mathematically, this result can be demonstrated as follows. Harberger (2008a) defines the “price
formation equation” for corporate and noncorporate goods as
dpC = φK(dr + tKC) + φLdw and dpNC = θKdr + θLdw
respectively; where dpC , dpNC , dr and dw are the total change in the price of corporate goods, noncor-
porate goods, capital, and labor, respectively. tKC is a tax on the income from capital in the corporate
sector. The parameters φK , φL, θK , and θL are the shares of K and L in the production cost of the C
and NC sectors, accordingly. If the noncorporate sector is tradable, then dpNC = dr = 0, hence dw = 0
as well. Using this result in the price equation for the corporate nontradable sector, then dpC = φKtKC .
2Similarly, using the price formation equation for the corporate sector previously defined and assuming
that the corporate sector is tradable, then dpC = dr = 0, and φLdw = −φKtKC . The implication for
10
This model shows that the incidence of the CIT is born by labor because it is an
immobile factor, while capital that is assumed to be perfectly mobile escapes taxation.
Also, the country’s decision to modify its CIT rate has no effect on the world prices of
capital and tradable products, thus we can think of this change as occurring in a small open
economy (or a group of small open economies). For the large open economy, Harberger
argues this scenario can be analyzed within a two-sector close economy framework, as
shown above, and the conclusions will still remain the same: the incidence of the CIT
falls on all capital income, in this case worldwide, and not just on capital income from
the taxed country. However, capital owners in the large open economy will bear a smaller
burden (compared to the burden predicted in the closed-economy model shown in section
2.1) because there is a “very large sponge (world capital market) to help absorb the capital
that is being ejected” from the large economy (Harberger, 2008a, p. 293).
2.1.2 Harberger extensions: (ii) Four-sector open economy model
Harberger further advanced the tax incidence analysis by developing a four-sector
open economy model that allows to determine the burden of CIT changes in both small
and large open economies scenarios (Harberger, 1995, 2008a). The model divides the
economy into corporate (C) and noncorporate (NC), tradable (T) and nontradable (NT)
sectors, with Manufacturing (T) and Public Utilities & Transportation (NT) representing
the corporate side, while Agriculture (T) and Services (NT) represent the noncorporate
sectors. Also, Harberger considers the CIT as a tax wedge that affects the preexisting
cost structure in the C sector.
The open economy assumption implies that capital (the mobile factor) can easily
escape taxation compared to labor, therefore the incidence of the CIT will depend on
the size of the economy where the tax is imposed. For the small open economy, the
rate of return on capital r is determined in world markets, hence the burden of the CIT
the price of the NC nontradable products is that dw = −(φK/φL)tKC , hence dpNC = −θL(φK/φL)tKC .
That is, the price of the NC nontradable goods and services declines.
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lies mostly on workers. On the other hand, for the large open economy, the corporate
tax causes a significant movement of capital to international markets, decreasing r, thus
capital owners, worldwide, bear the burden of the CIT. Capital owners, however, are not
the only ones bearing the burden of this tax because the movement in factor prices might
shift some of this burden to consumers and workers as well. These arguments are further
developed as follows.
The imposition of the CIT in a small open economy will not release a significant
amount of capital to world markets; hence we cannot expect r to decline. In the Manu-
facturing sector, the wedge imposed by the corporate tax tKC cannot increase the price
of manufacturing products pM because this sector is tradable, therefore Manufacturing
wages have to decline to absorb the extra cost added by the tax. This decline in wages is
not only in the Manufacturing sector, but economy-wide, therefore consumers will benefit
from a decrease in the price for Services pS, as labor cost decline. Since the Agriculture
sector is tradable, the decline in wages does not affect the price for agricultural products
pA, but land rents increases, therefore landowners are benefited.
3 The CIT also affects
the price in the Public Utilities and Transportation sector pUT—which is corporate and
nontradable; however the effect depends on the degree of capital intensity of this sec-
tor with respect to Manufacturing. That is, pUT will increase, decrease, or no change
depending on whether Public Utilities & Transportation is more, less, or equal capital in-
tensive than Manufacturing. Harberger considers the former more capital intensive than
Manufacturing, therefore he concludes that pUT will raise.
For a large open economy, e.g., the United States, the CIT causes a significant amount
of capital to flow to both the local noncorporate sector and the international markets,
decreasing the rate of return to capital worldwide. This prediction is similar to the closed
economy case in the sense that capital owners face the burden of the tax as their income
3Land rent increases because land is considered as a productive factor in the Agriculture sector and
“reproducible capital” (K) is assumed to be out of agriculture (Harberger, 2008a, p. 291).
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from capital declines. However, the drop in r predicted in the open economy model
is significantly lower than predicted in the closed economy case, because international
markets absorb part of the capital that has been released. As capital is shifted abroad,
labor income will increase relative to capital income, hence foreign workers will gain from
this tax, however foreign landowners will lose as land rents also decline.
For the rest of the large open economy, the changes in goods and factor prices will be
similar to the small open economy case. Manufacturing prices are determined worldwide,
thus pM will not be affected with the CIT. Again, wages will have to fall economy-wide
to absorb the tax wedge inserted by the CIT, and both local landowners and consumers
of services will gain from the decline in labor cost. However, the increase in pUT will
harm capital and labor owners, but only in their roles as consumers. Harberger indicates
that the worldwide decline in r affects all capital markets (including credits, bonds, and
others), thus individuals participating in those markets will bear the burden of the CIT
as well. For instance, borrowers will benefit from the worldwide decline in the interest
rates.
The result that the imposition of the CIT does not affect pM because this sector
is tradable is based on the conjecture that Manufacturing products are homogeneous
worldwide. While this might be the case for certain manufactured products (such as steel
or electrical wiring) or products from particular sectors (such as Agriculture or Mining),
this is a strong assumption for Manufacturing overall. Thus, Harberger extends this
model by allowing the local to foreign manufacturing price ratio pm/p
∗
m to increase with a
change in the CIT. As expected, if the CIT causes manufacturing—and national—wages
to decline, the effect will not be as large as before because the price for manufactured
goods rises.
The four-sector open economy model, which Harberger considers as his “own favorite
open-economy model” (Harberger, 2008b, p. 305), offers great insight about how the
incidence of the CIT is distributed among capital owners, workers, and consumers under
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different scenarios: small or large open economies that produce homogeneous or non-
homogeneous goods. The main conclusions from Harberger’s original two-sector economy
model still remain in the sense that as long as capital is mobile between sectors, or
countries, a large proportion of the incidence of the CIT will fall on the immobile factors,
e.g., labor and land. Also, the mobility of capital does not rule out the possibility for
capital owners to bear the incidence of this tax; however, this incidence is considerably
reduced as it is distributed across a large number of capital owners worldwide.
The next section presents a survey of the empirical evidence on the incidence of the
CIT. This literature centers on the short-term incidence of this tax, ignoring the long-
term effects of capital reallocation on the price of goods, services and production factors.
The majority of the studies published during the 1960’s and 1970’s tried to estimate the
impact of the CIT on the rate of return to capital, while few of them focused on the effect
of the CIT on consumers. The most recent literature developed during the 2007-2011
period, centers the attention on the impact of the CIT on workers. However, As we move
through all these studies, it will be shown that the incidence of the CIT still remains
unknown in the economics literature.
2.2 Empirical evidence on the incidence of the Corporate in-
come tax
2.2.1 The debate between Krzyzaniak & Musgrave vs Cragg, Harberger, &
Mieszkowski
After Harberger published his seminal paper in 1962, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963)
(henceforth referred to as K-M) published one of the most controversial studies attempting
to empirically estimate the incidence of the corporation income tax by applying time series
regressions.4 Using annual data from 1935 to 1959 for U.S.’s industries, they estimate that
4Before K-M, other studies addressed empirically the incidence of the CIT, including Lerner and
Hendriksen (1956) and Clendenin (1956). Lerner and Hendriksen analyzed the effect of changes in the
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an increase in the corporate tax rate has a positive and significant impact on the gross-of-
tax rate of return on corporate capital.5 After running different econometric specifications,
K-M find that the elasticity of the rate of return on corporate capital with respect to the
corporate tax rate is significantly greater than one, therefore the corporation income tax
is more than 100% shifted. This result implies that capital owners significantly benefited,
in after-tax income terms, from an increase in the corporation income tax rate.6
The results from Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) were immediately questioned based
on their model inability to account for other factors that may explain the positive and
significant correlation between the tax changes and the rate of return on corporate capital
(Goode, 1966; Slitor, 1966). The strongest critics to K-M model were Cragg et al. (1967)
(henceforth referred to as C-H-M), who demonstrated that the K-M’s estimates were
positively biased. According to C-H-M, the high positive correlation between the tax
variables and the gross rate of return on capital is due to “other important forces” that
influenced the economic environment—including World War II, the Korean War, and the
mobilization years, causing profit rates to be considerably high when the government
increased the tax rate (Cragg et al., 1967, p. 813). In addition, C-H-M argued that the
non-tax explanatory variables introduced in the Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) model
are not able to account for cyclical factors that affected the high correlation between profit
rates and the tax rates; therefore, they claimed that the relationship found in K-M was
completely spurious.
To prove their arguments, Cragg et al. (1967) re-estimated K-M’s model introducing
corporate tax rate on the rate of return on investment for all profitable corporations in the manufacturing
sector for the years 1927 to 1952. Cledenin conducted a similar study for the years 1926 to 1952. These
authors did not find evidence of short- or long-run shifting of the corporation income tax.
5K-M use data at the industry level as well as at the firm level. The industry data includes Manufac-
turing, Pulp and Paper, Rubber, Leather and Hide Products, Food and Kindred Products, and Stone,
Clay, and Glass Products. The firm level data is divided into 26 steel companies, and 12 textile compa-
nies. They also excluded from the sample the years from 1943 to 1947 because they argued this period is
characterized by “abnormal conditions,” including price controls, high level of government expenditures,
among other reasons (see Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963, p. 68-69).
6The 95% confidence limit estimated in this study gives a degree of shifting between 111% to 157%
(see Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963, p. 46).
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two additional regressors: (i) the employment rate Et as a proxy for the business cycle, or
demand fluctuations in the economy, and (ii) a dummy variable Wt to account for the high
level of government intervention in the economy during the mobilization and war years.7
C-H-M admitted that the introduction of these new covariates cannot correct for all the
sources of the biasness because the employment rate might be endogenous. Furthermore,
they demonstrated that the inclusion of the pressure variable Et will overstate the shifting
coefficient model hence resulting in an upper bound for the degree of tax shifting; however,
the bias in Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) should be attenuated it. After introducing
Et, C-H-M found the coefficient on the tax variable to be considerably less than one
(indicating less than 100% shifting of the CIT), and when they controlled for the war
years, this coefficient was even negative and not statistically significant.8
In 1970, K-M wrote an article responding to all the criticisms from Cragg et al. (1967).
Basically, the authors recognized that their tax shifting estimates might be biased, but
they argued that it is still significant and thus there was no evidence suggesting that this
bias is of considerable magnitude. K-M also agreed that the non-tax variables used in
their model may fail to fully control for the current demand pressures and the business
cycle. However, they pointed out that the employment variable used in C-H-M study is
endogenous, therefore it is inappropriate for the estimation; also, despite the fact that the
introduction of the year dummy variable significantly reduced the coefficient on the tax
variables, this result only suggest that “the model does not permit us to choose between
the hypotheses of zero and full shifting,” instead of rejecting the shifting hypothesis at all
(Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1970, p. 770).
7C-H-M defined the employment rate as Et = (1− µt)×100, where µt is the unemployment rate; and
Wt = 1 if t = [1941, 1942, 1950, 1952], or zero otherwise.
8The degree of tax shifting found in C-H-M depends on the definition of the tax variable employed
in their specifications. When using the ratio of tax liability to capital stock Lt, they show that the tax
shifting coefficient estimated in K-M study is reduced from 1.511 to 1.024, after the introduction of Et.
This coefficient is reduced further to 0.60 and becomes statistically insignificant when both Et and Wt
are added as regressors. When the tax variable is defined as the ratio of tax liability to gross-of-tax
profits—i.e., the average tax rate, the estimated degree of tax shifting is significantly reduced from 0.481
to -0.101, being also insignificant across most of the specifications (see Cragg et al., 1967, p. 817-18).
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Finally, as indicated above, the Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) model was severely
criticized in many econometric aspects, including errors in variable measure bias, omitted
variable bias, multicollinearity, misspecification, and lack of theoretical framework. How-
ever, this model was the center of discussion in corporate tax shifting for more than a
decade and, therefore, the subsequent empirical literature was based on replications and
improvements to K-M’s work, applied to both U.S. and international data. Overall, the
next generation of models tried to control for demand pressure and increasing productiv-
ity variables, employed multi-equation and panel data regressions, or used disaggregated
data at the firm level to estimate the shifting of the CIT. However, as discussed in the
next section, economists still have not find agreement on the question of who bears the
final incidence of the corporation income tax.9
2.2.2 Other empirical studies: the literature of the late 1960’s and 1970’s
After the work of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), many authors proposed new ap-
proaches to empirically estimate the incidence of the corporation income tax. Gordon
(1967) indicated that the K-M model was not derived from a theoretical framework and
it also failed to control for increases in demand pressures. Therefore, he proposed a
theoretical model where a representative manufacturing firm follows a mark-up pricing
behavior to maximize profits and introduces capacity utilization measures. The model is
estimated with industry level data for the years from 1924 to 1962 by non-linear regression
methods, and he finds no evidence of short-term shifting of the corporation income tax.10
9For the case of India, Laumas (1966) estimated the K-M model and found a degree of CIT shifting
of 107%. However, Rao and Rao (1971) used a modified version of K-M, with lagged values of the tax
variables, estimated by OLS and they did not find evidence of shifting of the CIT for Indian corporations.
Roskamp (1965) estimated a version of K-M model similar to Rao and Rao (1971) for the case of West
Germany, during the period from 1949 to 1962, and found a degree of shifting ranging between 108% to
140%. For United Kingdom, Davis (1972) estimated the K-M model, for the years 1949 to 1964, and
concluded that there is no shifting of the CIT. Spencer (1969) added a pressure variable to the K-M
model—the ratio of actual to potential GDP, and he found a degree of tax shifting between 100% to
124% in Canadian’s manufacturing corporations, for the period 1935-39 and 1948-64. For more details
and discussions on these models refer to Sahni and Mathew (1976, p. 65-77).
10Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1968) indicates that Gordon’s failure to integrate the tax variable into
one of the behavioral equations—e.g., price or wage, invalidates his model to explain the shifting of the
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Oakland (1972) also used annual data on U.S. manufacturing industries for the years
1930-1968 to analyze the effects of corporate income taxes on the rate of return to capital.
The novelty of this paper is that it defines the rate of return on capital as a function of
technological progress, capital intensity, and the short-run fluctuations in output. He
uses the labor to capital ratio as a measure of capital intensity, the ratio of actual to
potential output (or capacity utilization) to control for the effects of demand fluctuations
on the profit rate, and assumes a constant rate of technological progress.11 Oakland
did not find evidence of short-run shifting of the CIT; the introduction of the tax rate
does not increase the explanatory power of the model, so he concludes that Krzyzaniak
and Musgrave (1963) mistakenly attribute to the tax variable the effects of technological
progress and business cycle fluctuations on the rate of return on corporate capital.
Dusansky (1972) argues that manufacturing firms are heterogeneous and operate in
different markets under a variety of demand conditions, hence the construction of models
based on the maximization of an objective function for a representative firm, such as
Gordon (1967) and Oakland (1972), is misleading. Further, the approach results in a
“na¨ıve specification” to empirically estimate the shifting of the corporate income tax
(Dusansky, 1972, p. 359). Therefore, he suggests a multi-equation and multi-goal model
where firms attempt to achieve, simultaneously, three major goals: (i) a profit goal (ii) an
inventory goal, and (iii) a sales effectiveness goal. Dusansky specifies a set of structural
equations to represent this behavior.12 Dusansky’s study covers the period from 1925
to 1962, and the model is estimated by two-stage least squares for U.S. manufacturing
CIT.
11Specifically, the rate of technological progress is assumed to be an exponential function of time, i.e.,
A = et, where t is the calendar time minus 1929. Alternatively, he uses the output to capital ratio,
A = (Y/K), a measure of capital productivity, to allow for technological changes in production (see
Oakland, 1972, p. 240-41).
12This model contains a total of sixteen equations, from which eight are intent to capture the firm
behavior, including equations for the rate of return on capital, tax liability, manufacturing inventory,
sales, wages, output productivity, labor supply and the price level. There are six equations representing
macroeconomic variables, including output, consumption, gross investment, other investments, imports
and the interest rate. The remaining are identities.
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industries.13 He concludes that when cyclical variables are considered and modeled as
endogenous, as opposed to how they were handled in previous studies (Cragg et al., 1967;
Gordon, 1967), the results still support the conclusion of about 100% short-term shifting
of the corporate income tax.
To this point, the empirical literature on the incidence of the corporate tax centered
on estimating profit equations (either in reduced- or structural-form), disregarding other
possibilities of tax shifting, e.g., forward shifting or backward shifting. In 1979, Sebold
proposed a simultaneous equation model to address this gap. His model is estimated
by two-stage least square method with annual data from the corporate manufacturing
sector, on an establishment basis, for the periods 1931-41 and 1946-70.14 He omitted
the years from 1942 to 1945 due to the high degree of the U.S. government intervention
during the Second World War, and he also truncated the sample to 1970 based on the
imposition of wage and price controls in the economy in 1971. Sebold finds that 154% of
the tax is forward shifted as higher consumer prices, whereas 80% is backward shifted as
a reduction in both labor (33%) and input prices (47%); therefore, he concludes that 69%
of the burden of this tax is shifted.15
2.2.3 Recent evidence: the late 1990’s and 2000’s
In the 1980s, the empirical literature on this subject was virtually abandoned. The re-
search on the incidence of the corporation tax was focused on general equilibrium models,
in which the Harberger (1962) model is modified to introduce new assumptions, including
multiple sectors, substitutability among goods produced, imperfect mobility of factors,
13In the first stage, Dusansky estimate all endogenous variables in the rate of return equation as a linear
function of the exogenous covariates in the system, which are also considered as instruments. Then, in
the second stage, the rate of return equation is estimated (see Dusansky, 1972, p. 366).
14Sebold (1979) presents a system of eight equations, including profits, producer price, demand function,
wage, employment, input price, depreciation, and retention rate equation—which is defined as one minus
the effective tax rate. He introduces this retention rate into the manufacturing price, wage, input price,
and depreciation equations to test the hypotheses of forward and backward shifting of the CIT.
15There is a remaining negative portion of the tax effect that he identifies as “depreciation effect” (5%),
which cannot be considered part of the forward or backward shifting measures (Sebold, 1979, p. 407-8).
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unemployment, life time income, and firm’s financial decisions (Slemrod, 1983; Miyagiwa,
1988; Fullerton and Rogers, 1993; Gravelle and Kotlikoff, 1989, 1993).16
In 1998, Dye empirically analyzes the incidence of the corporate income tax on in-
vestors, workers, and consumers using financial statement data from Standard & Poor’s
1996 Compustat Annual Data tapes for U.S. firms in the manufacturing sector. She uses
three time series specifications, estimated by simple OLS regressions, to determine if cor-
porate taxes have a significant impact on the returns to corporate equity, profit margins,
and labor compensation, for the years 1977 to 1996. She finds that the coefficient on
the tax variable is significant and has the desirable sign in both the profit margin and
the return on equity specifications, therefore concluding that the corporate tax is borne
by consumers and investors. Also, since she finds that the estimated coefficient of the
tax variable in the labor compensation specification is not statistically significant, she
concludes that “the burden of the tax is borne by at least two players, shareholders and
consumers” (Dye, 1998, p. vii). However, Dye does not make any effort to correct for the
potential bias induced by economic fluctuations and/or the relationship between corporate
profits and the amount of tax paid.
As the evidence on the effect of corporate taxes on the rate of return on capital
appeared to be contradictory, more recent studies are using international data to focus on
the effect of corporate income taxes on wages.17 For instance, Hassett and Mathur (2006)
employ a panel data with seventy-two countries for the years 1981-2003 to estimate a fixed-
effect model that controls for time covariates as well as macroeconomic and institutional
variables, including trade, inflation, and the strength of labor unions. They find that
16I do not cover general equilibrium studies in this review. However, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) published a comprehensive survey regarding this literature. The CBO’s survey concludes that
the short-term incidence of the corporate income tax might be born by capital owners—stockholders
and investors, whereas the long term incidence is partly shifted to immobile factors, e.g., labor and land
(Rogers, 1996, p. 27). However, Gentry (2007) also reviewed the evidence provided by general equilibrium
models and concluded that the wide spectrum of answers in this framework only suggest that the burden
of the CIT remains as an empirical question.
17For a survey in this literature see Gentry (2007, p. 4-15).
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one percentage increase in the corporate tax rate decreases average wages by 0.95%.18
Moreover, the response on wages to changes is significantly larger in small countries than
large ones, thus they conclude that corporate taxes might be negatively affecting wages
through a decrease in the amount of capital investment per-worker.
Felix (2007) focuses on how the degree of economic openness might affect the incidence
of the corporate tax on wages. She uses panel data that covers thirty countries, for the
period 1979-2002, from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). This dataset contains indi-
vidual and household information on income, expenditures, demographics, labor market
outcomes and taxes. She specifies a log-linear random-effect regression that allows for
individual characteristics to analyze the impact of the average corporate tax rate as well
as the interaction between average taxes and economic openness on annual gross wages.
Her evidence supports that a 10% increase in corporate taxes reduces average annual gross
wages about seven percent.
Arulampalam et al. (2008) modify the efficient bargaining model of McDonald and
Solow (1981) and introduce a corporate income tax to analyze the process in which firm
managers and union workers bargain over both wages and employment. The idea is that
the corporate tax reduces the share of profits that are available for bargaining, therefore
any attempt of managers to keep a certain rate of return would result in shifting some
of the tax to workers. To assess the effect of the corporate tax, they specify a log-linear
dynamic equation in which the wage rate depends on the value added and the tax liability
per worker, company specific fixed- and time-effects, and a vector of variables associated
with wage bargaining, including alternative wages and workers union density. For the
estimation, they employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
GMM-methods, to control for company-specific unobserved heterogeneity, in a sample of
more than 55,000 companies located in the European Union for the years 1996 to 2003.19
18Hassett and Mathur (2006) estimates for the degree of shifting range between -84% to -119% across
different specifications.
19Arulampalam et al. (2008) employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) method using the lagged levels of
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Their estimates shows that one dollar increase in the CIT reduces the wage rate by 0.96
cents and 0.92 cents in the short- and long-term, respectively.
Although these studies use different international databases and empirical methods, it
is noticeable that they all find a strong and significant impact of corporate income taxes
on wages. This contrast with the previous studies developed during the 1960’s and 1970’s,
which were not able to arise to a consensus. However, there are a few important points
that are worth mentioning. First, these studies seem to measure short-term effects of the
corporate income tax on wages. Thus, the fact that these studies suggest almost 100%
shifting in the short-term is not in line with the prediction of theoretical models, such as
in Harberger (1962, 1995), which suggest that the short term incidence of the tax might
fall on capital owners, while the impact of the corporate tax on wages come after the
capital stock has been adjusted in the economy.
The time period of these studies seems to be too short to capture long-term effects of
tax policy—seven years of data in Arulampalam et al. (2008), thus it is difficult to expect
many permanent changes in policy during this time span. Also, there is not a significant
effort in these studies to address the problem of endogeneity between wages and corporate
taxes (besides Arulampalam et al. (2008), who employ the GMM estimator), therefore
the econometric techniques proposed are incurring in the same failures as the studies
developed after 1960’s.20
More recently, Nadja Dwenger and Steiner (2011) have argued that the literature has
omitted essential employment factors when assesing the true tax burden of the corporate
income tax on labor. That is, previous studies only consider the bargaining resutls and
its effect on the wage rate but neglected the ensuing employment effect. For instance, if
the variables as instruments for the endogenous differences in the first-difference model. However, they
argued that they prefer the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator because the levels of the instruments are
weak predictors of the differenced endogenous variables when the time series are highly persistent. The
advantage of the later estimator, according to the authors, is that it combines the moment conditions for
the model in first differences with the moment conditions for the model in levels.
20For more discussion on these studies refer to Gentry (2007, p. 13-16).
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employment changes can affect the total wage bill, this may offset the effect of corporate
taxes on the wage rate, thus overstating the true burden on labor. They correct this
problem by using a pseudo-panel data from Germany for the period 1998 to 2006 and
estimating and IV-model to control for the endogeneity induced by firm-specific tax rate.
Their incidence calculations indicate that an increase in $1 euro of corporate tax collec-
tions would reduce the wage bill by 0.47 euro, thus labor bears approximately 53% of the
incidence of the CIT. When they estimated the incidence of the CIT without considering
employment changes, they find a 100% shifting of the CIT.
Table 2.1: Summary of Findings on the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
Incidence No Shifting Shifting < 100% Shifting > 100%
On Capital
C-H-M (1967) K-M (1963)
Gordon (1967) Laumas (1966)a,*
Oakland (1972) Raskamp (1965)b,*
Rao & Rao (1971)a,* Spenser (1969)d,*
Davis (1972)a,*
On Wages
Sebold (1979) Hasset et. al (2006)e
Deveraux (2008)e
Felix (2007)e
Dwenger & Steiner (2011)f
On Prices
Sebold (1979)
Dusanski (1972)
Note. K-M: Krzyaniak and Musgrave (1963); C-H-M: Cragg et al (1967).
∗Application or modification of the K-M model; aIndian corporations; bWest Germany; cUnited
Kingdom; dCanada; eMulti-country panel data; fGermany panel data.
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Table 2.2: Empirical Literature on the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
Author Methodology Data Incidence Result
Krzyaniak &
Musgrave (1963)
Time series (a) Industry level, annual from
1935-1959a
ROEt =
pi
e
Shifting ≥ 100%
IV estimation (b) Firm level, 1936-1959. RCKt =
pi
K
Cragg, Harberger &
Mieszkowski (1967)
K-M (1963) plus
cyclical variables
K-M (1963) K-M (1963) No shifting
Sebold (1979) Reduce form model,
2SLE
Annual data 1931-41 & 1946-70,
Manufacturing sectorb
Profit, prices, and
wages
Consumers (154%)
and labor (80%)
Gordon (1967) Non-linear regres-
sions
SOI data for 1924-1962 for 2-digits
code manufacturing industries
RCKt =
CF
K
No shifting
Oakland (1972) Time series regres-
sion
U.S. Manufaturing, annual for
1930-1968
RCKt =
pi
K
No shifting
Dusanski (1972) 2ELS estimations Oakland (1972), 1925-1962 RCKt =
pi+i
K
Shiftin ≥ 100%
Hassett & Mathur
(2006)
Panel data, fixed ef-
fects
Annual for 72 countries; period
1981-2003
Wages (w) 1% increase in CIT ⇓
w by 0.8% to 1.19%
Felix (2007) Panel data, fixed ef-
fects
Annual for 30 countries; period
1979-2002.
Wages (w) 10% increase in CIT
⇓ w by 7%
Arulampalam et al.
(2008)
Panel data, GMM
Arellano & Bond
Firm level data, annual for 55,082
European companies
Wages (w) Shifting from 96% to
92%
Dwenger & Steiner
(2011)
Panel data, IV
method
Firm level, annual for 1998-2006 Wages (w) Shifting = 53%
Note. ETR : Effective tax rate; TL : tax liability; pi: profits before tax; K : capital stock; e : equity; CF : cash-flow (profits plus depreciation
amortization, and interest payments) RCK : return on capital; ROA : return on assets; ROE : return on equity.
aThe 1943-1947 period is excluded based on price controls & other government interventions. bYears for World War II are ommitted.
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CHAPTER III
Modeling and Estimation Approach
3.1 Modeling approach
This section models the effect of the corporate income tax for a large and open multi-
sector economy. The approach extends Harberger (1995, 2008a)’s four sector economy
and also follows very closely the General Equilibrium models of Gravelle and Smetters
(2006) and Randolph (2006).
There is a large open economy (e.g., United States) which freely trades with the rest
of the world (ROW). The economy is divided into eight sectors, each producing goods
and services using labor, capital, and land (in Agriculture). The supply of these factors
is fixed in the economy. The production functions have constant return to scale and are
well behaved (i.e., concave, twice differentiable, etc.). There is free mobility of factor of
productions, but only capital is mobile worldwide. There are eight sectors in the econ-
omy producing goods and services of which only two are non-corporate (Agriculture and
Services), six are corporate, and four are tradable: two with perfect demand substitutes
and two with imperfect substitutes.
The Mining sector (Corporate) produces tradable and homogeneous goods—e.g., gold,
iron, zinc, etc.—for which its price is determined at international markets. To simplify
the analysis, it is standard in the literature to consider the production from a sector with
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these characteristics as the numeraire. Therefore, the price formation equation for Mining
is given by:
dpMG = 0 = θL,MGdw + θK,MG(dr + tCK) (3.1)
where, dpMG, dw, dr are the total changes in the price for mining products, in the wage
rate, and in the return to corporate capital, respectively; tCK is the tax on corporate
capital and the term in parenthesis (dr + tCK) represents the cost of corporate capital,
or Ck; the parameters θL,MG and θK,MG measure the income, or cost, shares of labor
and capital for the mining sector, respectively, the price for mining products is fixed,
dpMG = 0, because it is determined worldwide.
The assumptions of perfect competition and free mobility of factors imply that the
wage rate needs to decline economy-wide to offset the higher cost of capital:
dw = −θK,MG
θL,MG
(dr + tCK) (3.2)
Equation 3.2 says that the drop in wages depends on the degree of capital intensity of the
Mining sector. That is, the larger the income share of capital in Mining θK,MG, higher will
be the drop in wages necessary to absorb the tax wedge created by tCK . Table 3.1 shows
estimates for the capital income shares across different industries. My estimates of the
capital income shares for U.S. industries (column 3) are very similar to those reported in
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) (column 2), which suggests that the capital income shares
are very stable across different time periods and industry classifications. Since the share
of capital income in Mining (θK,MG = 68%) is significantly higher than the share of labor
income, the decline on the wage rate is expected to be large.
The Manufacturing and Finance sectors both produce non-homogeneous tradable
goods and services, respectively. (Perhaps given the technological advances in the U.S.
economy compared to the ROW). Therefore, the price formation equation of these sectors
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Table 3.1: Industry Capital Shares Estimates
Industry Acemoglu (2008)a Vasquez (2011)b
1. Agriculture3 — 74%
2. Mining 66% 68%
3. Transportation & Utilities — 51%
Transport. & Warehousing 35% —
Utilities 77% —
4. Construction 32% 31%
5. Manufacturing — 36%
Durable goods 27% —
Nondurable goods 47% —
6. Wholesale & Retail Trade — 44%
Wholesale Trade 46% —
Retail Trade 42% —
7. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate — 75%
Finance & Insurance 45% 42%
8. Services4 33% 34%
9. All sectors — 43%
Private sectors — 47%
Note. Industry classification is based on SIC system.
aAverages for 1987-2005. Adapted from Acemoglu & Guerrieri (2008), Table 1, pg. 486.
Estimates based on the NAICS system. bAverages for 1945-2007. Estimates based on the SIC.
cThe large magnitude in Agriculture is explained by the land income share, which is part
of the capital income share (see Valentinyi and Herrendorf, 2008).
dIn Acemoglu & Guerrieri (2008) refers to “other services except government.” In
Vasquez-Ruiz (2011) refers to Services as classified in the SIC.
will be:
dpi = θL,idw + θK,i(dr + tCK) (3.3)
for i= Manufacturing, Finance. In both sectors, the labor cost and capital cost will change
by the same magnitude as the changes produced in the numeraire sector, e.g., Mining.
That is, wages will decline with the tax, while the cost of corporate capital will rise. Thus,
pi will increase (or decrease) if the income share of capital in sector i is significantly larger
(smaller) than the share of income for labor, compared to the numerarie.
The rest of the corporate sectors are Wholesale & Retail Trade, Construction, and
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Utilities & Transportation. They all produce non-tradable goods and services and, there-
fore, their prices will react according to equation 3.3. As in Harberger (1995, 2008a), I
will expect that the price for the Utilities & Transportation sector will rise due to its large
capital income share.
The two non-corporate sectors are Agriculture and Services. The former is assumed
to produce tradable and homogeneous goods, while the later only operates in the local
market. Following Harberger (1995, 2008a), Agriculture produces using capital, labor,
and land, therefore:
dpAG = 0 = θL,AGdw + θK,AGdr + θLanddl (3.4)
where θLand,AG and l are the share of income to land and the land rent, respectively.
1
Equation 3.4 implies that land rent will change according to:
l = −(θL,AG
θLand
dw +
θK,AG
θLand
dr) (3.5)
As capital flows from the corporate to the non-corporate sector, its rate of return (r)
declines. The wage rate also drops in Agriculture, according to equation 3.2 above.
Therefore, the corporate income tax causes an increase in the land rent prices, thus
benefiting landowners. Based on the same arguments, prices for the Services sector (non-
corporate and non-tradable) will decline:
dpS = θL,Sdw + θK,Sdr (3.6)
1Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) estimated the capital income share for Agriculture in 54%, of which
18% corresponds to land income share. They also present estimates for capital income shares in other
sectors, including Manufacturing (33%) and Services (34%); see table 1, pg 826.
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3.2 Estimation procedure
The disagreements in the extensive literature on this subject about who bears the
burden of the CIT show that measuring the incidence of this tax is a challenging task.
One of the reasons that could explain such significant differences in both results and
opinions is that the econometric models used in this literature might not be adequately
analyzing the effects of policy changes; for example, a change in the corporate income tax
might be biased because the estimated parameters from these time series regressions are
not invariant to the structural changes in the economy caused by policy making (Lucas,
1976, p. 20). That is, the parameter that supposedly determines the degree of corporate
tax shifting might not only reflect the effect of a change in the corporate tax but also
the adaptation (or reaction) of corporations to the environment that could be motivating
such policy change. Therefore, the conclusions derived from previous empirical models
might be misleading.
In general, the factors that motivate CIT changes are often correlated with other devel-
opments in the economy, such as a decline in economic activity, and therefore separating
these effects from exogenous policy changes can be very difficult. Moreover, the estimates
of the incidence of the CIT based on time series regression models might reflect shocks
to the private sector that are not the result of policy decisions. For instance, during the
period considered, a shock might cause corporations to optimally change financing deci-
sions to reduce tax liabilities—e.g., a switch from equity to debt financing, or corporations
might simply decide to change pricing and hiring strategies in response to the economic
situation.
Thus far, the econometric models and techniques used to estimate the incidence of the
CIT have failed to separate those effects. For instance, the early time series studies of
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), Gordon (1967), and Oakland (1972), among others, do
not make any distinction between the corporate tax changes that results from exogenous
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policy decisions and the tax changes that arise from endogenous economic events. More
obviously, the results from these models seem to be very susceptible to the control variables
included, as well as the sample period chosen. In addition, these studies claim to estimate
the short-term incidence of the corporation tax based on the implausible assumption that
the capital stock is immobile across sectors during the period under consideration—which
in some cases is more than twenty years. The more recent empirical evidence, based on
panel data estimations, also considers all changes in the tax variable as policy changes.
Further, few authors attempt to offer short- and long-run estimates of the incidence of
the CIT. However, this distinction is not always clear since the time period analyzed is
no more than five or seven years (see Arulampalam et al., 2008).
To isolate the effects of policy changes from events occurring within the economy, a
number of authors are using a new technique based on the identification of exogenous
events that alter fiscal policy through the examination of narrative records. For instance,
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use narrative records from historical accounts and Business
Week and identify exogenous events leading to military build-ups to analyze the effects
of government purchases in the economy—i.e., GDP, interest rates, hours worked, and
consumption of durables and nondurable goods. Also, based on Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) exogenous events, Edelberg et al. (1999) and Burnside et al. (2004) determine the
effects of government purchases on employment, real wages, and residential investment.2
More recently, Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) use narrative records from presidential
speeches and congressional reports to identify tax policy changes that are not systemat-
ically correlated with developments within the economy during the postwar era. These
authors provide a comprehensive analysis of more than 50 federal tax legislations in the
United States for the period 1945-2007 and determine the effect of tax policy changes on
U.S.’s economic activity—i.e., GDP, consumption, investment, and imports. The Romer
2The events referred to in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) are the Korean War (1950Q3), Vietnam War
(1965Q1), and Carter-Reagan buildup (1980Q1).
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and Romer (2009) exogenous events have been applied by a number of authors investi-
gating the effect of fiscal policy on the U.S. economy. For instance, Merterns and Ravn
(2011) develops a new narrative measure of exogenous tax changes using the changes in
personal and corporate income tax identified in Romer and Romer (2009) plus controlling
for measurement errors and present new estimates on the effect of tax policy on the econ-
omy. Also, Barro and Redlick (2011) use the narrative records from both Ramey (2009)
and Romer and Romer (2009) to estimate government spending and tax multipliers.
I propose a similar approach to determine who bears the short- and long-term incidence
of the corporate income tax. Specifically, using exogenous events in corporate tax policy,
this paper analyzes the effects of corporate tax changes on the rate of return to capital,
consumers’ good prices, and wages. The identification of exogenous corporate tax changes
is based on the work of Romer and Romer (2009), among other reports and documents.
The estimation strategy employs a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model, as popularized
by Sims (1980). This model provides a description of the dynamic interrelations between
multiple time series included in a vector.
There are several advantages from the VAR model approach. First, the VAR model
does not requires introducing restrictions, besides lag-length restrictions, imposed by the
theory about the relationships that we are describing, treating all variables as endogenous.
For this reason, VAR models are sometimes referred to as atheoretical models. Since there
is still no consensus about who bears the burden of the corporate income tax, this offers a
significant advantage because this estimation method basically allows the data to “speak
freely” (Hoover et al., 2008, p. 254). More importantly, this characteristic does not rule
out the possibility that we can formulate and test “hypotheses with economic content”
(Sims, 1980, p. 16). Further, the estimation of impulse-response functions, an important
component of Vector Autoregressions, will allow to assess in a simple graph the short-
and long-term effects of corporate tax changes on the variables of interest. Finally, given
certain conditions, VAR models can be easily estimated through OLS regressions.
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The estimated VAR model is represented as:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 +B(L)Dt + t (3.7)
where A(L) and B(L) are finite vector ordered polynomials in nonnegative powers of the
lag operator, L. Xt is a vector of endogenous regressors, Dt is a vector representing the
exogenous changes in the corporate income tax, or Romer & Romer shocks, and t is a
vector of error terms, or shocks. Particularly, t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Ω). The vector Xt includes
variables that measure the rate of return on corporate capital RCKt, the average tax
rate ATRt, wages Wt, and the price of goods and services Pt. Due to the limited sample
size (at most 63 observations for each industry), I sometimes substitute ATRt for other
regressors, such as the real gross domestic product GDPrt, or the output gap as it is
standard in the literature.3
The vector Dt is of particular interest because it contains the exogenous corporate tax
policy changes. As mentioned in section 4.2, the exogenous policy changes are measured
using an indicator variable that identifies the dates in which these shocks occurred. That
is, Dt = 1 if an exogenous policy change (either a tax increase or decrease) in the CIT
occurred in year t, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the response of the endogenous variables
in X to a exogenous change in corporate tax policy will be given by the polynomial
expansion of [I−A(L)L]−1B(L).4
Alternatively, for a particular equation in (3.7), it is possible to obtain the impulse-
response function to show the effect of a shock in the jth variable at time t on the value
of the ith variable at time t + s, once the effects of all other variables in the model are
controlled for—e.g., consider the effect of a shock in the average tax rate, ATRt, on the
3The output gap is calculated as the difference between GDPr and its time trend, with the trend
calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
4This approach also allows to test for asymmetries in tax policy changes: (i) corporate tax rate
increases and (ii) corporate tax rate decreases. Refer to section 4.2 to see the years for which Dt represents
exogenous increases or decreases in the CIT.
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rate of return to corporate capital, RCKt+s. For this purpose, we write the VAR model
in equation (3.7) as a linear function of past innovations:5
Xt = µ+ t + Ψ1t−1 + Ψ2t−2 + . . . (3.8)
where each matrix Ψs measures the effect of t on the future observation Xt+s. That is,
∂Xt+s
∂′t
= Ψs; (3.9)
Thus, the (i, j) element of Ψs measures the impact of a one-unit change in the innovation
of the j variable at t (jt) on the ith variable at time t + s (xi,t+s), holding all the other
innovations at all dates constant.
5Equation (3.8) is known in the literature as the moving average (MA) representation of a VAR model.
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CHAPTER IV
The Data
There are two major components that comprise this data set: prices and tax policy
changes. For prices, I calculate and obtain information on the rate of return on corporate
capital, the wage rate, and the prices of goods and services across eight major U.S.
industries. The tax policy variable is based on the exogenous fiscal shocks in the corporate
income tax recorded in Romer and Romer (2009, 2010), in the Statistic of Income (SOI)
annual reports, among other documentations. Other control variables are also included
and they are described below. The sample period for this study runs from 1945 to 2007,
and the frequency is annual.
The industry classification is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
system for the years from 1945 to 1997, and the North American Industry Classifica-
tion System (NAICS) from 1998 onwards. The information is compiled for eight major
industries: (i) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery (henceforth referred to as Agriculture);
(ii) Mining and quarrying (Mining); (iii) Construction; (iv) Manufacturing; (v) Public
Utilities and Transportation (Utilities); (vi) Wholesale & Retail (Trade); (vii) Finance,
insurance, real estate and lessors of real property (Finance); and (viii) Services. In order
to make both classification systems comparables, I had to “bridge” the series from the
NAICS to the SIC system using weights calculated from the U.S. Census Bureau.1
1The methodology to construct the bridge between NAICS and SIC is fully explained in the U.S.
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4.1 Bridge from NAICS to SIC
In 1997, the change from the SIC system to the new industrial classification system
based on the NAICS considerably affected the comparability of the time series with those
of prior years. Table 4.1 shows the major changes to the industrial classification as well as
some of the adjustment employed to harmonize (or bridge) the NAICS series with the SIC
series. With the introduction of the NAICS, the number of major industries, or 2-digit
code industries, significantly expanded from eight sectors (column 1) to nineteen sectors
(column 2). Therefore, it was necessary to bridge the new NAICS system to the prior
1997 SIC system in order to obtain a data set from 1945 to 2007 based only in one system:
the SIC classification system (column 3). Also, whenever it was impossible to retrieve a
NAICS subsector and add it back to the corresponding SIC sector, I calculated industry
weights to make the proper adjustments. These weights were constructed using the ratio
of the value of receipts for a particular subcategory to the total value of receipts of the
2-digit industry classification reported in the 1997 Census.2
Table 4.1 explains the bridge process. While some major industries were not virtually
affected with the switch from SIC to NAICS—e.g., Agriculture and Mining, particular care
should be taken comparing industries such as Manufacturing, Transportation & Utilities,
and Services, among others, which are sectors with similar titles in both NAICS and SIC,
but composed of different sub-sectors. For instance, table 4.1 shows that the Agriculture
sector was unaffected after the introduction of the NAICS system. The Mining sector,
titled “Mineral Industries” in the SIC, only required a minor change with the NAICS
system, because it now excludes part of industries classified under the Professional, Sci-
entific and Technology Services sector: geophysical surveying and mapping services for
metal mining, oil and gas extractions, and non metallic mineral mining. These three
Census Bureau’s website (see Census, 1997) as well as in section 5 of the 1998 Statistic of Income annual
report (IRS, 1998).
2The total value of receipts includes “the total sales, shipments, receipts, revenue, or business done
by establishments within the scope of the economic census,” Census (1997).
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Table 4.1: Bridge Between NAICS and SIC: 1945 - 2007
1987 SIC 1997 NAICS Bridge: NAIC to SIC
(8 Industries: prior 1997) (19 Industries: 1997-onwards) (8 Industries: 1997-onwards)
1. Agriculture 1. Agriculture 1. Agriculture
2. Mineral Industries 2. Mining
2. Mining
Mining from NAICS
+0.1% of Prof. Scientific & Tech
3. Manufacturing 3. Manufacturing
3. Manufacturing
Manufacturing from NAICS
+Publishing Industries (Inform.)
+0.3% of Other Services
4. Transp., Communic., 4. Transp. & Warehousing 4. Transp., Communic.,
and Utilities 5. Utilities and Utilities
. . . 6. Adm. & Support Transp. & Warehousing (NAICS)
... 7. Information + Utilities
8. Service Industries . . . + Waste Manag. (Adm. & Support)
... + Telecommunications (Inform.)
19. Other Services + . . .
...
8. Service Industries
subcategories, unreported in the Statistic of Income (SOI) report’s tables, represent 0.1%
of the total receipts in Professional, Scientific and Technology Services.
To build the Manufacturing sector series based on the SIC system, I took the new
Manufacturing series from the NAICS system and added the “Publishing Industries”
subcategory, which under the NAICS is part of the new 2-level digit code “Information”
industry. I also added 0.3% of the total value of recepts from the “Other Services”
industry to account for data from auxiliary establishments not included with the new
manufacturing data. These adjustments were performed until the bridge between NAICS
and SIC was completed for all sectors.
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4.2 Tax policy variable: Romer & Romer shocks
Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) analyze more than fifty tax reforms, from 1945 to
2007, and classified all tax policy changes for the post war era in four major categories
attending their motivation: (i) spending-driven, (ii) countercyclical, (iii) deficit-driven,
and (iv) long-run growth. The spending-driven fiscal policies are motivated by changes in
government spending (e.g., raise taxes to finance a war), while countercyclical tax policy
changes intend to return output to its normal trend (e.g., a tax cut to fight a recession).
Both of these actions are considered “endogenous tax changes.” On the other hand, deficit
driven actions are taken to tackle a current government deficit, while long-run tax policy
changes are intended to promote economic growth as well as efficiency and fairness in the
tax system. These later two policy actions are classified as “exogenous tax changes.”3
To illustrate the Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) procedure, let’s consider four policy
changes, each corresponding to one of the motivations defined above:
• Revenue Act of 1950. The motivation for this policy was to raise taxes to cover
for defense spending related to the Korean War. This tax policy took the form of
increases of marginal tax rates on individuals and corporations. In the Letter to
Committee Chairmen on Taxation of Excess Profits, President Truman stated:
“After the communist aggression in Korea last summer, the Congress
recognized the need for greatly increasing the Government’s revenues to
meet the grave dangers that confront our country” (p. 1).
Similar statements appeared repeatedly in the Midyear Economic Report of the
President for 1950, the Congressional Record (1950), among a number of Senate
reports and documents. For this reason, this policy is classified as “endogenous
spending-driven.”
3For details and examples on this classification system refer to Romer and Romer (2009).
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• Public Law 89-800. Enacted on September of 1966, this policy suspended the 7%
investment tax credit and its motivation was to return output to its normal trend.
When addressed the Congress for the introduction of this reform, President Johnson
recommended:
“the Congress promptly make inoperative,. . . , those special incentives
for plant and equipment investment and commercial construction that
currently contribute to overheating the economy” (Special Message to the
Congress on Fiscal Policy, 1966, p.1).
Among the reports that presented similar statements were 1967 and 1968 Economic
Report of the President, the 1967 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on
the State of the Finances, and a number of Congressional reports. Thus, this policy
change is classified as “endogenous countercyclical.”
• Revenue Act of 1971. The 1972 Economic Report of the President suggested
that policy makers were concerned about promoting economic growth beyond its
long-term trend: “The economy was rising. . . ; but the rise was not as fast as was
desirable, especially from the standpoint of reducing unemployment” (p. 65). For
this reason, the President introduced the Revenue Act of 1971 to promote growth
above normal:
“The fiscal package. . . was primarily motivated by the desired to stimulate
at once a more rapid expansion of the economy” (p. 69).
When there is not a consistent and systematic review of the documents that policy
makers use to introduce the reform, Romer and Romer (2009) recognizes that this
methodology might lead to wrong conclusions when classifying fiscal policy. For
instance, the House of Representatives indicated that “this bill is necessary because
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the performance of the economy in recent months has been unsatisfactory,”4 which
suggests that “Congress. . . might be acting to merely return growth to normal,”
thus indicating that this policy could be classified as “endogenous countercyclical”
(Romer and Romer, 2009, p. 55). However, the review of additional documents,
such as The Ways and Means Committee reports, among others, indicates that this
policy can be classified as “exogenous long-run growth.”
• Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. This reform proposed the reduction of tax
benefits from the Investment Tax Credit. President Reagan clearly stated the mo-
tivation for this policy in his 1982 Address to the Nation on the Fiscal Year 1983
Federal Budget:
“The most essential thing is to send a message to the money market that
we,. . . , can agree on reducing the deficit” (p. 3)
The U.S. Congress was more energetic than the president to recognize the need to
reduce the fiscal deficit when it declared that the reason for this bill was “to raise
revenue as part of an effort to narrow the unacceptably large budget deficits. . . ”
(emphasis are mine).5 For those reasons, this policy is classified as “exogenous
deficit-driven.”
Based on Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) classification method, I identified twenty
exogenous policy changes in the corporate income tax for the period from 1945 to 2007.
Figure 4.1 plots the rate of return of corporate capital in the Manufacturing sector and the
exogenous policy changes in the CIT. The first panel shows all changes in the corporation
tax. These policy changes are separate into seven exogenous policies that increases the
corporate income tax (second panel), and thirteen exogenous policies decreasing the CIT
(bottom panel).
492d Congress, 1st Session, House of Representative Report No. 92-533, 9/29/71, p.3.
597th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Report No. 97-494, Vol. 1, 7/12/82, p. 96.
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The exogenous changes in the CIT, in figure 4.1, are recoded into an indicator variable
Dt that identifies the dates in which these shocks occurred. That is, for the exogenous
policy changes that increased the CIT in the 1945-2007 period, Dit = 1 if t =[1976, 1982,
1984, 1986, 1987, 1993, 2004], and 0 otherwise. For the exogenous decreases, then Ddt = 1
if t =[1953, 1954, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1978, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987, 2003], and
0 otherwise.
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Figure 4.1:
Retun to corporate capital in Manufacturing and exogenous policy changes in the
corporate income tax (CIT), 1945-2007.
Section ?? in the appendix shows all the information compiled about policy changes
(endogenous and exogenous) in the corporate income tax, for the period from 1945 to
2007. The major refereferences for this information were Romer and Romer (2009) and
the Statistics of Income (SOI) annual reports published by the IRS. The first row describe
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the policy information related to the Revenue Act of 1945. This policy (or act) was signed
in November of 1945 and it consisted on a reduction in the Corporte Income Tax. The
policy was classified as endogenous spending-driven because it intended to compensate the
decline in government spending that followed the end of WWII by increasing aggregate
demand. The fiscal year assigned to this policy was 1945. That is, Ddt=1945 = 0 for this
particular year.6
A number of policy changes, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1962, where slightly
more complex than the one described above because they consisted on both policies that
increased and decreased the corporate income tax. This Act, for example, reduces the
corporation’s income tax payments through the modification of depreciation guidelines
but, at the same time, introduces provisions that increased compliance. In this case,
the tax policy variable takes the value of Ddt=1962 = 1 for exogenous tax decreases and
Dit=1962 = 1 for exogenous increases.
4.3 Return to corporate capital and tax rates
I use information from the Statistics of Income (SOI) annual reports, published by
the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to estimate the
rate of return of corporate capital and a measure for the tax rate. These reports contain
information on the balance sheets and income statements at the industry level for the
United States. The IRS uses a probability sample as the basis of the data tabulated from
corporate returns. The industries are classified under the SIC system for the period from
1945 to 1997 and the NAICS system for the 1998-2007 period, therefore it was necessary
to bridge the industry level series using the methodology explained in sub-section 4.1.7
The return on corporate capital for industry i at time t is calculated as the ratio of
6The fiscal year runs from June 1st to July 31st, of the following year.
7For tax year 2007—which includes the accounting periods ending July 2007 through June 2008, the
SOI’s statistical estimates are based on a stratified sample of approximately 106,000 unaudited reports
selected from 5.9 million corporate returns filed (IRS, 2007).
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corporate profits (pi) to the corporation’s capital stock (K):
RCKit =
piit
Kit
, for i = 1, ..., 8 and t = 1945, ..., 2007; (4.1)
where profits are defined as the sum of net income—i.e., the difference between total
income and total deductions reported—plus interest paid.8 The capital stock is composed
of equity capital, which includes both common and preferred stocks, and the interest
bearing debt (IBD)—the total amount of bonds, notes, and mortgages payable maturing
in the short and long term. The measure of return on corporate capital in equation (4.1)
is applied in a number of studies addressing the question of the incidence of the CIT (see
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, 1963; Cragg et al., 1967) as well as in studies from the finance
literature that employ accounting-based measures of operating performance (see Barber
and Lyon, 1996; Ghosh, 2001).
However, a number of authors use a slightly modified version of equation (4.1) to mea-
sure the effect of corporate tax changes on the return to corporate capital. For instance,
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) subtract the IBD component from the denominator—
which gives a measure of the return on equity capital, or ROE; Dusansky (1972) substi-
tutes this denominator for total assets, obtaining a measure for the return on assets, or
ROA. Gordon (1967) employs a similar version of equation (4.1) but introduces a cash-
flow measure of profits, i.e., adding to the numerator other expenses such as depreciation,
amortization, and depletion. To test for consistency, I employ the measure of RCKit
defined in (4.1) and compare the results with those using the ROA, ROE, and cash-flow
measures defined above. I also constructed an additional measure for the return to capital
using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and I did not find any significant
difference in the estimated impulse response functions.9
8Total income (or receipts) includes, but it is not limited to, gross sales, gross receipts from operations,
interest received on government obligations, and so on. Total deductions consist of cost of goods sold,
cost of operations, depreciation, amortization, among other components.
9From the BEA, I take the ratio of profits before taxes (NIPA Table 6-17) to private fixed assets
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I also calculate and obtain two alternative measures of corporate tax rates: the average
tax rate, ATRit, and the nominal statutory tax rate, NSTRt. The former is calculated
as the ratio of total tax liabilities, or simply tax paid, to corporate profits for a partic-
ular industry i at time t.10 The latter refers to the federal tax rate legally imposed on
corporations. Both ATRit and NSTRt are based on information from the SOI reports.
11
4.4 Wages and prices
The measure of wagesW 1it is taken from estimates of average weekly earnings of produc-
tion and nonsupervisory employees, produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)’s
Current Employment Survey (CES). This survey offers information on employment, pay-
roll, and hours worked in a monthly basis. Thus, the annual estimates are obtained
multiplying by 52 the 12-months monthly averages. Alternatively, I employ information
on employees’ total compensation and wages and salary accruals at the industry level pub-
lished by the BEA, W 2it. Total compensation for employees consist of wages and salaries
plus employers’ contributions to social security, pension, and health insurance funds.
The data on prices for goods and services correspond to information on consumer P cit
and producer P pit price indexes, also produced by the BLS. The data are published monthly
for a set of industries (e.g., Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities, etc.) and commodities
(e.g.,oil and chemical products). Thus, to construct the series, I took 12-months seasonally
adjusted averages as annual estimates.
A number of studies that analyze the incidence of the CIT on consumers and workers
use the measures of prices and wages detailed above (Sebold, 1979; Hassett and Mathur,
2006). However, alternative measures can also be obtained from the corporation’s balance
(NIPA Table 3.1ES) as a measure for the return to corporate capital on each major industry. This data
also required to bridge the NAICS and SIC series.
10As a result of the Korean War, the U.S. Congress imposed an excess profits tax—i.e., a tax on profits
over a certain level, effective from 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1953. The SOI reports separates the excess
profits tax from the total tax paid category, but I combined both categories in order to obtain the total
tax liability for the 1950-1953 period.
11Table 2.2 shows a comprehensive list of measures applied in this literature.
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sheets and income statements. For instance, Arulampalam et al. (2008) and Dye (1998)
used the ratio between the cost of employees to the number of employees and the ratio of
corporate profits to total sales as measures for the industry (or company) average wages
and prices, respectively. These later measures are not considered here.
Table 4.2 illustrates the summary statistics for some of the series collected and con-
structed from the information in the SOI reports for the All Industries category. For
the period 1949 to 2007, average profits for all corporation, which is obtained as the
sum of net income plus interest paid—totaled $743,082 billion. Also, the average rate
of return on corporate capital (RCK) is 20.6%, significantly larger than the return on
assets (5.7%). The mean value for the average tax rate (24.4%) is significantly below than
the average tax rate stablished in the U.S. legislation (NSTR=43.3%), suggesting that
corporations reduce a large amount of their tax liability using loopholes and provisions,
such as amortization, depreciation, and depletions. The minimum value of 34% for the
NSTR was established during the 1987-1993 period through the 1986 Tax Revenue Act.
The reduction in the statutory corporate tax follows a worldwide trend seing across many
developed economies. The series L − stock is an alternative measure for the corporate
income tax—found in Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), which is obtained as the ratio of
tax liabilities to capital stock.12
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the set of financial indicators and tax measures calculated
for each industry for the 1945-2007 period. According to these calculations, the highest
average return to corporate capital is obtained in Mining (32.4%), followed by Manufac-
turing (26.9%), Finance (22.3%), and Trade (21.8%). The smallest average return for the
period 1945-2007 is shown in Agriculture (10.8%). However, the Agriculture sector born
the highest average tax rate in the 1945-2007, at 59.1%.
Figure 4.2 shows the U.S. nominal statutory tax rate (NSTR) for the period 1945-
12Dusansky (1972) uses a similar idea to measure the changes in the corporate income tax, but he
employs the ratio of tax liabilities to total assets. See appendix table for details.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for All Industries Combined
Series Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Assets 15,007,830 20,306,262 441,461 81,486,346
Capital Stock 4,124,511 5,266,315 127,707 18,295,354
Profits 743,082 908,573 25,134 3,921,896
Interest Paid 400,579 477,598 2,198 2,085,113
Net Income 342,503 451,032 22,876 1,948,655
Tax Liability 119,494 174,669 8,710 1,248,285
RCK 20.6% 4.6% 9.8% 32.3%
ROA 5.7% 1.1% 2.9% 8.1%
ROE 71.3% 33.1% 31.6% 154.7%
ATR 24.4% 10.9% 10.5% 46.7%
NSTR 43.3% 7.0% 34.0% 52.0%
Lstock 5.1% 2.5% 1.4% 11.5%
Note. Sample period from 1945 to 2007, in billions of US$.
2007. The figure suggests several changes in the U.S. corporate tax policy. In 1949, the
U.S. federal corporate tax rate was 38%. As the government needed resources to finance
the Korean War, it increased the NSTR to 50.75% in 1951. For over a decade the NSTR
was maintained at this level until it was reduced to 48% in 1965 and to 34% in 1987. The
last corporate tax change recorded in the sample was in 1994, when the U.S. government
slightly increased the NSTR to 35%.
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Table 4.3: Financial Indicators by Industry
Sector Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agriculture RCK 10.8% 4.6% 3.7% 25.7%
ROA 6.2% 2.5% 2.2% 14.4%
ROE 34.6% 15.4% 7.7% 83.2%
ATR 25.5% 11.6% 11.5% 59.1%
L-stock 2.8% 2.0% 0.8% 8.3%
Mining RCK 32.4% 41.7% 4.7% 208.0%
ROA 10.1% 10.8% 1.6% 56.8%
ROE 159.3% 252.6% 17.8% 1010.6%
ATR 36.9% 14.1% 15.0% 71.3%
L-stock 13.5% 19.8% 1.3% 95.5%
Construction RCK 21.4% 7.5% 9.5% 45.2%
ROA 7.1% 2.3% 3.4% 14.1%
ROE 139.1% 119.4% 24.8% 586.7%
ATR 36.9% 14.1% 15.0% 71.3%
L-stock 5.8% 3.4% 2.2% 15.8%
Manufacturing RCK 26.9% 7.2% 10.9% 46.3%
ROA 9.5% 2.8% 3.8% 17.1%
ROE 115.4% 55.4% 39.5% 221.7%
ATR 34.6% 11.3% 17.9% 59.1%
L-stock 9.8% 4.9% 2.5% 23.6%
Note. Sample period from 1945 to 2007.
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Table 4.4: Financial Indicators by Industry (Cont.)
Sector Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Utilities RCK 10.7% 2.7% 3.0% 16.2%
ROA 5.8% 1.2% 1.4% 7.4%
ROE 39.7% 20.2% 13.8% 104.8%
ATR 27.7% 8.9% 16.1% 48.8%
L-stock 2.9% 1.0% 0.7% 7.1%
Trade RCK 21.8% 6.8% 12.1% 46.3%
ROA 8.3% 2.5% 5.7% 18.3%
ROE 99.0% 52.1% 31.7% 224.7%
ATR 28.9% 11.3% 13.9% 57.8%
L-stock 6.5% 3.6% 2.2% 19.1%
Finance RCK 22.3% 7.9% 10.1% 47.7%
ROA 3.7% 1.4% 1.8% 7.6%
ROE 78.4% 45.9% 28.9% 200.3%
ATR 10.0% 5.2% 2.2% 20.3%
L-stock 2.1% 1.0% 0.8% 4.2%
Services RCK 14.7% 4.4% 6.5% 31.9%
ROA 7.0% 2.2% 2.4% 16.5%
ROE 71.3% 33.3% 27.8% 138.6%
ATR 27.4% 10.5% 11.4% 46.1%
L-stock 4.0% 2.0% 1.5% 11.4%
Note. Sample period from 1945 to 2007.
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CHAPTER V
Estimation and Results
5.1 An exogenous increase in the CIT
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the impulse response functions. The columns present the
effect of a exogenous increase in the corporate income tax on the rate of return on corpo-
rate capital RCK (column 1), the worker’s wages (column 2), and the price of goods and
services (column 3). Each row or section corresponds to a particular sector, and the scale
on the ordinal axis (“x” axis) of each individual chart measures time in years. Following
a common practice in this literature (Sims and Zha, 1999; Ramey, 2011), the bootstrap
standard error bands shown are 68% bands.
The first row in figure 5.1 shows the effect of a exogenous increase in the corporate
income tax on the return, or cost, of corporate capital, wages, and prices, respectively, for
the Mining sector. The cost of corporate capital initially increases about 0.1% (or 10 basis
points) with the introduction of the tax. Over time, the RCK reaches slowly its pre-tax
level in approximately 17 years. The increase in the corporate cost of capital causes a
significant drop of approximately 2% (up to 3% withing the first two-years) in the wage
rate. After two years of the imposition of the tax, workers’ wages slowly increase but
never come back to the pre-tax level. In the long-term, the CIT causes a drop of 1% in
the wage rate for workers in the Mining sector. Thus, the increase in the cost of corporate
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capital is more than offset by a decline in the wage rate, which suggests that corporate
owners of Mining companies shift (more than fully) the burden of the CIT to workers. In
the third column, we observe a permanent drop in the price of mining products, which
could be explained by the firm’s gains obtained from a permanent decline in labor cost.
For Transportation & Utilities (corporate, non-tradable), panel 2 in figure 5.1, the
effect of an increase in the CIT is exactly what Harberger’s model would predict. The
CIT raises the cost of corporate capital, increasing the gross rate of return approximately
0.2%, or 20 basis points. The cost of corporate capital takes approximately 7 years to pull
back to its pre-tax level. The wage rate initially drops by 0.5% to absorb tax tax-wedge.
Although worker’s wage rate consistently increases after they absorve the CIT, it never
returns to its pre-tax conditions, thus significantly affecting workers in this sector. Prices
significantly increase as a result of the large capital intensity of the Transportation &
Utilities sector.1
The response to an exogenous increase in the CIT for the Wholesale & Retail Trade
(third row in figure 5.1) and Construction (second row in figure 5.2) are very similar. In
both sectors, the CIT causes an increase in the cost of corporate capital—approximately
6% in Wholesale & Retail and 10% in Construction. The wage rate declines to absorb the
tax-wedge. Prices in Wholesale & Retail increases by 1.5%, while in Construction raises
by only 1% after few years of the imposition of the tax.
As capital moves from the corporate to the non-corporate sectors, the return to capital
declines in the Service sector (panel one in figure 5.2). The decline in the rate of return
to capital is more than 4% withing the first two years; thereafter, the return to capital
increases until it reaches its pre-tax level, in about 25 years. Workers in the service sector
bear a small burden of this tax as wages decline. Prices unambiguously decline as a result
of a lower labor and capital cost, as predicted in Harberger (1995, 2008a,b), benefiting
1For Transportation & Utilities, the average value added to capital is approximately 51% for the
period from 1947 to 2009.
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capital owners and workers as consumers in this sector.
The third section in figure 5.2 illustrates the effect of the CIT on the Manufacturing
sector. Similar to Mining, the impulse response functions show that the increase in
the CIT raises the cost of corporate capital, returning to its pre-tax level after four
years. However, wages in the manufacturing sector significantly increase with the tax
(an unpredicted result in light of Harbergers model). For a tradable sector with non-
homogeneous goods such as Manufacturing, the models of Harberger (2008a,b), Gravelle
and Smetters (2006), and Randolph (2006) suggest that the respond to prices will depend
on the degree of capital (or labor) intensity with respect to the numeraire sector, e.g.
Mining. For Manufacturing, prices increases as a response to the higher cost in both
capital and labor.2
Overall, the results above are generally in light of Harberger (1995, 2008a,b)’s pre-
dictions. An exogenous increase in the CIT raises the cost of capital in the corporate
sectors of Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Utilities, Wholesale & Retail Trade,
and Construction due to the imposition of the tax-wedge. For the non-corporate sectors,
such as Services, the return to corporate capital declines with the tax. Therefore, this
analysis suggests that, in the short-term, capital owners bear the burden of the corporate
income tax.
For an open economy with perfectly homogeneous and tradable goods, Harberger
(1995, 2008a,b) predicts that wages will decline economy-wide to fully absorb the CIT.
In other words, the response of wages will depend on the degree of competition and the
price elasticities that producers will face in international markets. The estimations above
show that wages significantly decline across all non-tradable sectors, i.e., Services, Trans-
portation & Utilities, Construction, and Wholesale & Retail Trade. Also, wages in the
Mining sector, which could be assume that produces an homogeneous and tradable good
2The capital share in Manufacturing (36%) is significantly lower than Mining (68%), thus the labor
cost will have a larger weight than the capital cost in determining the evolution of prices for manufacturing
products. See table 3.1 for details.
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(e.g., fuel and nonfuel minerals), also decline with the tax.3 However, in Manufacturing
wages significantly increase after the imposition of the CIT.
Finally, the effect of the CIT on the price of goods and services will depend on the
capital shares of each industry analyzed. The results show that for highly capital intensive
sectors, i.e., Transportation & Utilities, Construction, Manufacturing, and Wholesale &
Retail Trade, prices increase with the tax. Further, prices decline for sectors with a
relative low capital income share: Mining and Services. Therefore, these results validate
the original predictions from Harberger (1995, 2008a,b) on the effect of an exogenous
increase of the corporate income tax for a multi-sector open economy.4
3In 2010, the U.S. exports of mineral raw materials (e.g., gold, soda ash, zinc, concentrates, etc.)
totaled $7.5 billion, while exports of processed minerals (e.g., metals, chemicals, etc.) were $87 billion
(Survey, 2011).
4The estimates of the capital income share in Agriculture and Mining are 74% and 43%, respectively.
However, these large estimates, compared to other sectors in the economy, are attributed to the land
income share, which is also part of the capital income share, in both Agriculture and Mining. For example,
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) find that Agriculture has the largest land share in the economy (18%),
which is approximately one-third of Agriculture’s total income share to capital.
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Figure 5.1: Exogenous increase in CIT
52
Im
p
u
l
s
e
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
10 20 30
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
RCK
10 20 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Wages
10 20 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
Prices
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
10 20 30
−20
−10
0
x 10−3
10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
10 20 30
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
10 20 30
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
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5.1.1 A Note on Agriculture and Finance Sectors
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Figure 5.3: Effect of an increase in CIT on Agriculture and Finance sectors
Figure 5.3 shows the impulse response functions for the Agriculture and Finance &
Insurance sectors, respectively. As before, the columns represent the return to corporate
capital (column 1), the wage rate (column 2), and the prices (column 3) in each sector.
In both, the return to capital initially drops. However, while we observe a permanent
negative effect in the rate of return to capital in Finance, the return in Agriculture becomes
mildy positive after approximately five years. The rebound in Agricultures rate of return
to capital might be explained by the rise in the return to land, which is part of the return
to capital and it is not accounted for in my estimations. (The capital income share in
Agriculture, including land rent, is 74%. See table 3.1 above). In the open economy
model of Harberger (1995, 2008a,b), agricultural prices do not change because products
are assumed to be tradable and homogeneous. However, we observe that Agricultural
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prices significantly decline with the tax (approximately 4%), which might be explain by
the drop in capital cost. For Finance, the rate of return initially drops by 0.08%, and
then slowly moves to its pre-tax level in about ten years. In both sectors, wages increase
after the CIT.
5.2 An exogenous decrease in the CIT
By intuition, Harberger’s model predicts that an exogenous decrease in the CIT will
have the opposite effects on the economy when compare to a tax increase. However,
there is no reason to expect a symmetric result in the empirical estimations because
the tax policy transmission mechanism can be very different for tax increases and tax
decreases. In fact, when analyzing the impact of tax changes on the economy, Romer
and Romer (2009) find that tax increases have a larger effect than tax decreases on GDP.
Similar results are found when estimating the effect of tax policy changes on consumption,
investment, among other macroeconomic variables.5
Firgures 5.4 and 5.5 show the the impact of a decrease in the CIT on the return to
corporate capital, the wage rate, and prices, across the same sectors shown above. In
general, the decrease in the CIT reduces the cost of capital almost in all sectors. The
wage rate also increase in Transportation & Utilities, Wholesale & Retail Trade, Services,
and Construction. Further, prices decline across all highly capital intensive industries,
including Transportation & Utilities, Mining, Construction, and Manufacturing. In the
labor intensive industry of Services, the decrease in the CIT causes an increase in prices,
which is attributed to the increase in labor cost, as Harberger’s model would predict.
5See also the results from Barro and Redlick (2011).
55
Im
p
u
l
s
e
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
5 10 15 20 25 30
−4
−2
0
x 10−3
M
i
n
i
n
g
RCK
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
Wages
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
Prices
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
x 10−4
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10−3
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.01
0
0.01
Figure 5.4: Exogenous decrease in CIT
56
Im
p
u
l
s
e
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
RCK
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Wages
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.02
0
0.02
Prices
5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−3
T
r
a
n
s
p
.
 
&
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.05
0
0.05
W
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
e
 
&
 
R
e
t
a
i
l
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
x 10−3
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
x 10−3
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3
Figure 5.5: Exogenous decrease in CIT
57
CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
The wellhead producers would say, “You know, we’re going to bear this tax, the
whole thing. Whatever percentage rate it is going to be, that is going to be borne
by us.” The next day, we would meet with the pipeline people, who would say, “You
know, we are going to bear this tax; the whole thing is going to fall on us.” The
refiners came in the next week. The refiners said, “We’re going to bear that tax,
the whole thing on us.” The retailers, they were going to bear the tax, the whole
thing. Labor groups, the same. Consumer groups came in and said, “You know, in
the end, the consumer is going to be paying this tax” (p. 75).
Thomas A. Barthold
Discussions on a proposed energy tax between the Joint Committee on Taxation
and representatives of different economic groups.
This paper employs a new and better methodology that allows for improved analysis
of how the incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) is distributed over time among
workers, consumers, and capital owners. Using annual information for the period from
1945 to 2007, I analyze the effects of exogenous changes in corporate tax policy on the rate
of return to corporate capital, the wage rate, and the prices of goods and services for eight
major U.S. industries: (i) Agriculture, (ii) Mining, (iii) Construction, (iv) Manufacturing,
(v) Public Utilities and Transportation, (vi) Wholesale & Retail Trade, (vii) Finance &
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Insurance, and (viii) Services. The identification of the exogenous changes on the CIT is
based on the work of Romer and Romer (2009, 2010), who provide an extensive analysis
of the U.S. federal tax legislation using narrative records from presidential speeches and
congressional reports, among other documentations.
The results are generally consistent with the predictions of Harberger (1995, 2008a,b)
models. An exogenous increase in the CIT raises the cost of capital in the corporate sec-
tors of Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Utilities, Wholesale & Retail Trade, and
Construction due to the imposition of the tax-wedge. As capital flows from the corporate
to the non-corporate sectors (Agriculture and Services), the return to corporate capital
declines. Further, the wage rate declines to absorb part of the tax wedge imposed with the
CIT. The drop wages is significant across in almost all sectors, i.e., Services, Transporta-
tion & Utilities, Construction, and Wholesale & Retail Trade, but not economy-wide. For
the Mining sector wages also decline. However, in Manufacturing and Agriculture, both
tradable with imperfect homogeneous goods, wages significantly increase with the CIT.
The estimations show that the CIT raises the prices of goods and services for high
capital intensive industries (i.e., Manufacturing, Transportation & Utilities, Finance &
Insurance, and Wholesale & Retail Trade). For sectors with a relative low capital income
share, such as Agriculture, and Services, prices decline with the tax.
For completness, I also show the impact of a CIT decreae in the economy. In gen-
eral, the results behave as the predictions from the theoretical model. That is, a drop in
the CIT reduces the cost of capital in almost all highly capital intensive industries—e.g.,
Transportation & Utilities, Construction, Mining, Finance & Insurance and Manufac-
turing. The wage rate increases in five out-of nine sectors (i.e., Finance & Insurance,
Services, Transportation & Utilities, Wholesale & Retail, and Construction). The lower
cost of capital has a negative impact on prices across all major capital intensive industries.
In Services, which is labor intensive, prices increase with the corporate income tax.
Finally, these results validate the original predictions from Harberger (1995, 2008a,b)
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on the effect of an exogenous increase of the corporate income tax for a multi-sector
open economy. Although, this paper does not calculates numerical burdens of the CIT,
Harberger (1995) obtains plausible estimations based on the results discussed above. He
concludes that U.S. capital bears a small burden of the CIT (about 25% of total CIT
receipts), while labor bears approximately 100% of the burden of the U.S. CIT. Further,
both capital owners and workers receive a benefit in their role as consumers, but this gain
is offset by the benefits obtained by landowners.
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APPENDIX A
Data Appendix: Time Series Plots
A.1 Time Series Plots
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Figure A.1: Return on Corporate Capital, Period 1945-2007. Source: Statistics of Income Report
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Figure A.2: Return on Corporate Capital - Cash Flow, Period 1945-2007. Source: Statistics of Income Report
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Figure A.3: Return on Assets, Period 1945-2007. Source: Statistics of Income Report
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Figure A.4: Return on Assets, Period 1947-2007. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure A.5: Return on Equity, Period 1945-2007. Source: Statistics of Income Report
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Figure A.6: Average Tax Rate, Period 1945-2007. Source: Statistics of Income Report
68
Years
A
T
R
 
B
E
A
,
 
I
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
(
%
)
1960 1980 2000
25
30
35
40
45
50
All Industries
1960 1980 2000
−200
−100
0
100
200
Agriculture
1960 1980 2000
−50
0
50
100
Mining
1960 1980 2000
10
20
30
40
50
60
Construction
1960 1980 2000
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Manufacturing
1960 1980 2000
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
Transportation & Utilities
1960 1980 2000
25
30
35
40
45
Wholesale & Retail
1960 1980 2000
30
40
50
60
70
Finance & Insurance
1960 1980 2000
10
20
30
40
50
Services
Figure A.7: Average Tax Rate, Period 1945-2007. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure A.9: Real GDP and Exogenous Corporate Tax Changes, Period 1945-2007
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APPENDIX B
A Primer in Time Series Regression and Vector
Autoression Models
B.1 Introduction to Time Series Econometrics
This section provides key concepts in time series analysis that are useful to understand
the Vector Autorregresive model applied in section ??. The following concepts and defini-
tions are neither comprehensive nor a substitute for any graduate time series econometric
textbook, and they follow closely the expositions in Wooldridge (2003), Tsay (2005), and
Hamilton (1994). For proofs and details, I will refer the readers to these authors.
Section B.1.1 of this appendix introduces the assumptions and properties of the OLS
estimator in small samples for time series regressions. Then, in B.1.2, I introduce the
concepts of strong and weak stationarity, which are useful to derive the large sample
properties of the OLS estimator. Section B.1.3 discusses some examples of weakly depen-
dent processes, including the autorregresive (AR) and moving average (MA) model. Also,
this section presents how is calculated the impulse response function (IRF) shown in our
estimations. The appendix ends discussing a simple example of a vector autorregresive
model and deriving its properties.
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B.1.1 Finite Sample Properties of OLS
The finite, or small, sample properties of the OLS estimator can be stated as follows:
• A.1. Linear in Parameters. The stochastic process, or time series process,
{(xt1, xt2, ..., xtk, yt) : t = 1, 2, ..., T} follows a model linear in parameters, e.g.:
yt = φ0 + φ1xt1 + ...+ φkxtk + at (B.1)
where {at} is a sequence of random shocks and T is the number of time periods.
• A.2. Strict Exogeneity. The regressors in (B.1), for all time periods, are strictly
exogenous: E(at|X) = 0 ∀ t = 1, ..., T .
• A.3. No Perfect Collinearity.
Theorem: Under A.1, A.2, and A.3 it follows that E(φˆj|X) = E(φˆj) = φj ∀
j = 0, 1, ...k. That is, φˆj is an unbiased estimator of φj.
• A.4. Homokedasticity. The variance of at is constant for all time periods:
V ar(at|X) = V ar(at) = σ2 ∀ t = 1, ..., T .
• A.5. No Serial Correlation. E(atas|X) = 0, ∀ t 6=s. Notice, if A.5 does not hold,
then {at} are serially correlated. Also, we are not making any assumptions about
the correlations in X.
Gauss-Markov Theorem: Under A.1 through A.5, the OLS estimators φˆj, ∀ j =
1, ..., k, are BLUE conditional on X.
B.1.2 Stationarity, Weakly Dependent Process, and Large Sample Properties
of OLS
On some occasions, the assumptions for the small sample properties of the OLS esti-
mators are violated—e.g., the strict exogeneity assumption might be violated when lagged
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values of the dependent variable are introduced in the model. Therefore, it is important
to rely on the large sample properties of OLS estimators. This section introduces the
concepts of stationary and covariance stationary processes as well as weakly dependent
time series, which are required to apply the large sample properties of the OLS estimator.
Stationary Process. The stochastic process {xt : t = 1, ..., T} is stationary (or
strictly stationary) if the joint distribution of (xt1 , xt2 , ..., xtk) is invariant when it is shift
t periods ahead to (xt1+t, xt2+t, ..., xtk+t) ∀ t, where k is an arbitrary positive integer and
(t1, ..., tk) is a set of k positive integers. When the opposite occurs, the stochastic process
{xt} is referred to as nonstationary process.
Covariance Stationary Process. The stochastic process {xt : t = 1, ..., T} is covari-
ance stationary (or weakly stationary) if E(x2t ) < ∞ and the following three conditions
hold: (i) E(xt) = µ, (ii) E(xt − µ)2 = σ2, and (iii) E[(xt − µ)(xt−l − µ)] = γl, for any
t, l ≥ 1. In other words, the process {xt} is covariance stationary if the mean and vari-
ance of xt are both time invariant and γl depends only on l. In what follows, the term
stationary process refers to covariance (weakly) stationary process.
Weakly Dependent Process. A covariance stationary process {xt} is weakly de-
pendent if ρl =
E[(xt−µ)(xt−l−µ)]√
E(xt−µ)2E(xt−l−µ)2
 0 as l  ∞. That is, the correlation between xt
and xt−l approach to zero quickly enough as l increases unboundedly. When the previous
hold, the stationary process is known to be asymptotically uncorrelated. Two examples of
weakly dependent processes are the autorregresive model and the moving average model.
Details about these models will be provide in section B.1.3.
Large Sample Properties of OLS. Assuming the time series process {(xt1, xt2, ..., xtk, yt) :
t = 1, 2, ..., T} is stationaty and weakly dependent, the assumptions and properties of the
OLS estimators are described as follows:
• A.1†. Linear in Parameters. Under this assumption the model can be repre-
sented as in A.1 above.
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• A.2†. Contemporaneous Exogeneity. The regressors in (B.1), at t, are contem-
poraneously exogenous: E(at|xt) = 0 for xt = (xt1, ..., xtk).
• A.3†. No Perfect Collinearity.
Theorem: Under A.1†, A.2†, and A.3† it follows that plim(φˆj) = φj ∀ j = 0, 1, ...k.
• A.4†. Contemporaneous Homokedasticity. V ar(at|xt) = σ2.
• A.5†. No Serial Correlation. E(atas|xtxs) = 0, ∀ t6=s.
Theorem: Under A.1† through A.5†, the OLS estimators are asymptotically nor-
mally distributed. Also, the standard hypothesis test: t-stat, F -stat, and LM -stat,
are asymptotically valid.
B.1.3 Weakly Dependent Processes: The Autorregressive and Moving Av-
erage Models
Subsection B.1.2 identifies the autorregresive and moving average models as examples
of weakly dependent processes. This section discusses the properties of both models and
develops few examples. The importance of the autorregresive and moving average models
is that they represent the basis for more advance time series models, including the Vector
Autorregresive Model.
B.1.3.1 Autorregressive Models
The autorregresive model (AR) is motivated when lagged values xt−l (l > 0) of the
stochastic process {xt : t = 1, ..., T} can be useful explaining xt. For instance:
xt = φ0 + φ1xt−1 + at t = 1, ..., T (B.2)
where {at} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random vari-
ables that follow a distribution with mean zero and constant variance, or simply∼ d(0, σ2a).
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The stocastic process {at} is also known in the literature as white noise. The model in
B.2 is known in the time series literature as autorregresive process of order one, or AR(1)
model. Under the assumption that {xt} is stationary, it is possible to derive some of the
properties of this model as follows:1
E(xt) = µ =
φ0
1− φ1 and V ar(xt) =
σ2a
1− φ21
(B.3)
Since stationarity requires that both the mean and variance of xt to be finite, i.e., φ1 6= 1,
and V ar(xt) > 0, thus |φ1| < 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for B.2 to be
stationary. This model can also be generalized to the AR(p) model:
xt = φ0 +
p∑
j=1
φjxt−j + at (B.4)
where p is an integer such that p > 0, the sequence {at} is i.i.d., and the first two
moments—e.g., mean and variance, can be obtained as we showed above.
B.1.3.2 Moving Average Models
If we assume that {xt : t = 1, ..., T} is explained by a sequence of random shocks, we
can entertain the following moving average (MA) process:
xt = c0 + at − θ1at−1 or xt = c0 + (1− θ1B)at t = 1, ..., T (B.5)
where c0 is a constant term, {at} is defined as before, and B is referred to as the “back-
shift” operator, i.e., Bat = at−1. Similar to the model in B.2, θ1 is a parameter such that
|θ1| < 1. When this requirement holds, the MA model is said to be invertible. If |θ1| = 1,
then the MA model is noninvertible. The model in B.5 is known as moving average of
1As mentioned, the term stationarity refers to as weakly stationary process. The stationarity assump-
tion implies: E(xt) = µ, V ar(xt) = γ0, and Cov(xt, xt−l) = γl, where µ and γ0 are constant and γj is a
function of j, or time invariant.
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order one, or MA(1) model, and it assumes that xt is a weighted average of the white
noise processes at and at−1. A more general model, MA(q), is represented by:
xt = c0 + (1− θ1B − ...− θqBq)at, with q > 0 (B.6)
Since the sequence {at} is i.i.d., uncorrelated, and it follows a distribution with mean and
variance equals to (0, σ2a), respectively, the first two moment of the MA(q) above can be
easily derived as:
E(xt) = c0 and V ar(xt) = (1 + θ
2
1 + ...+ θ
2
q)σ
2
a (B.7)
B.1.3.3 ARMA Models
It is possible to combine the models presented in subsections B.1.3.1 and B.1.3.2 into
a more general class of models known as autorregressive moving-average, or ARMA(p, q)
models. The ARMA(p, q) model assumes that the stochastic process {xt} does not only
depend on its lagged values but also on a linear combination of the white noise process
at. For instance, {xt : t = 1, ..., T} follows an ARMA(1,1) model if:
xt − φ1xt−1 = φ0 + at − θ1at−1 or (1− φ1B)xt = φ0 + (1− θ1B)at (B.8)
where it is required that φ1 6= θ1. Notice, when q = 0 the model in B.8 is reduced to the
simple AR(1) model case. Alternatively, if p = 0, then equation B.8 is equivalent to the
MA(1) shown in B.5. The general form of the ARMA(p, q) model can be written as:
xt = φ0 +
p∑
j=1
φjxt−j + at −
q∑
j=1
θjat−j (B.9)
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or, using the back-shift operator, B, the expression can be simplified as
(1− φ1B − ...− φpBp)xt = φ0 + (1− θ1B − ...− θqBq)at (B.10)
Impulse Response Function. The impulse-response function (IRF) measures the im-
pact of an exogenous shock on the series. To estimate this function, we can represent the
ARMA(p, q) model in B.10 as a MA process:
xt = µ+ at + ψ1at−1 + ψ2at−2 + ... = µ+ ψ(B)at (B.11)
where µ is the mean value of xt. Here, the coefficients {ψj} are known as the IRF of the
ARMA model and they measure the impact of the lagged shock at−j, for j > 0, on the
current value of xt. The stationarity assumption implies that ψj  0, as j  ∞. This
means that the effect of at−j on xt decays over time.2
2To obtain the MA representation in B.11, I use the long division of the polynomials φ(B) = 1 −∑p
j=1 φjB
j and θ(B) = 1−∑qj=1 θjBj , so that
θ(B)
φ(B)
= 1 + ψ1B + ψ2B
2 + ... ≡ ψ(B)
and the mean of {xt} is obtained as µ = E(xt) = φ01−φ1−...−φp . Please, see Tsay (2005, p. 62-63) for
details.
78
BIBLIOGRAPHY
79
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, D. and Guerrieri, V. (2008). Capital deepening and nonbalanced economic
growth. Journal of Political Economy, 116(3):467–498.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. R. (1991). Some test of specification for panel data: Monte carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies,
58(2):277–97.
Arulampalam, W., Maffini, G., and Devereux, M. P. (2008). The direct incidence of
corporate income tax on wages. Working Paper.
Auerbach, A. J. (2006). Who bears the corporate tax? a review of what we know. Tax
Policy and the Economy, 20:1–40.
Barber, B. M. and Lyon, J. D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance:
The empirical power and specification test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics,
41:359–399.
Barro, R. J. and Redlick, C. J. (2011). Macroeconomic effects from government purchases
and taxes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126:51–102.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. R. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1):115–143.
Boskin, M. J. (2010). Time to junk the corporate tax. The Wall Street Journal.
Bruce, N. (2001). Public Finance, chapter 11, Tax Incidence: Who Bears the Tax Burden?,
pages 325–52. Addison Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., Boston, MA, 2nd edition.
Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. (2004). Fiscal shocks and their conse-
quences. Journal of Economic Theory, 115:89–117.
Census (1997). 1997 economic census: Bridge between naics and sic. Technical report,
U.S. Census Bureau.
Clendenin, J. C. (1956). Effects of corporate income taxes on corporate earnings. Taxes,
24:391.
Cragg, J. G., Harberger, A. C., and Mieszkowski, P. (1967). Empirical evidence on the
incidence of the corporation income tax. Journal of Political Economy, 75:811–21.
80
Davis, J. M. (1972). An aggregate time series analysis of the short-run shifting of company
taxation in the united kingdom. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 24(2):259–86.
Dusansky, R. (1972). The short-run shifting of the corporation income-tax in the united
states. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 24(3):357–71.
Dye, W. R. (1998). An Empirical Analysis of the Incidence of the Corporate Income
Tax in the Manufacturing Sector. PhD thesis, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech
University.
Edelberg, W., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. M. (1999). Understanding the effects
of a shock to government purchases. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2:166–206.
Felix, R. A. (2007). Passing the burden: Corporate tax incidence in open economies.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Fullerton, D. and Rogers, D. L. (1993). Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden. Brookings
Institution Press, Washington, D. C.
Gentry, W. M. (2007). A review of the evidence on the incidence of the corporate income
tax. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), Paper 101.
Ghosh, A. (2001). Does operating performance really improve following corporate acqui-
sitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7:151–178.
Gillis, M. (2008). Discussion of corporation tax incidence: Reflections on what is known,
unknown and unknowable. In Diamond, J. W. and Zodrow, G. R., editors, Fundamental
Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications, chapter 6, pages 309–12. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Goode, R. (1966). Rates of return, income shares, and corporate tax incidence. In
Krzyzaniak, M., editor, Effects of Corporation Income Tax. Wayne State University
Press, Detroit.
Gordon, R. J. (1967). The incidence of the corporation income tax in u.s. manufacturing,
1925-62. American Economic Review, 57:733–58.
Gravelle, J. G. and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1989). The incidence and efficiency cost of corporate
taxation when corporate and noncorporate firms produce the same good. Journal of
Political Economy, 97(4):749–80.
Gravelle, J. G. and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1993). Corporate tax incidence and inefficiency when
corporate and noncorporate goods are close substitutes. Economic Inquiry, 31:501–16.
Gravelle, J. G. and Smetters, K. (2006). Does the open economy assumption really mean
that labor bears the burden of a capital income tax? Advances in Economic Analysis
and Policy, 6(1).
81
Gruber, J. (2007). Public Finance and Public Policy. Worth Publishers, New York, NY,
2nd ed. edition.
Hamilton, J. D. (1994). Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
Harberger, A. C. (1962). The incidence of the corporation income tax. The Journal of
Political Economy, LXX(3):215–40.
Harberger, A. C. (1980). Vignettes on the world capital markets. American Economic
Review, 70:331–9.
Harberger, A. C. (1995). The abcs of corporation tax incidence: Insights into the open-
economy case. In Tax Policy and Economic Growth, pages 51–73. American Council
for Capital Formation, Washington, D.C.
Harberger, A. C. (2008a). Corporation tax incidence: Reflections on what is known,
unknown and unknowable. In Diamond, J. W. and Zodrow, G. R., editors, Fundamental
Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications, chapter 6, pages 283–307. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Harberger, A. C. (2008b). The incidence of the corporation income tax revisited. National
Tax Journal, LXI(2):303–12.
Hassett, K. A. and Mathur, A. (2006). Taxes and wages. American Enterprise Institute.
Hoover, K. D., Johansen, S., and Juselius, K. (2008). Allowing the data to speack freely:
The macroeconometrics of the cointegrated vector autoregression. American Economic
Review, 98(2):251–255.
IRS (1998). Statistics of income - 1998: Corporation income tax returns. Technical report,
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC 2000.
IRS (2007). Statistics of income - 2007: Corporation income tax returns. Technical report,
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC 2010.
Kotlikoff, L. J. and Miao, J. (2010). What does the corporate income tax tax? a simple
model without capital. NBER Working Paper No. 16199.
Krzyzaniak, M. and Musgrave, R. (1963). The Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax.
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD.
Krzyzaniak, M. and Musgrave, R. (1968). The shifting of the corporation income tax in
u.s. manufacturing: Comment. The American Economic Review, 58(5):1358–60.
Krzyzaniak, M. and Musgrave, R. (1970). Corporation tax shifting: A response. The
Journal of Political Economy, 78(4):768–73.
Laumas, G. S. (1966). The shifting of the corporation income tax - a study with reference
to indian corporations. Public Finance, 21(4):462–73.
82
Lerner, E. M. and Hendriksen, E. S. (1956). Federal taxes on corporate income and the
rate of return on investment in manufacturing, 1927 to 1952. National Tax Journal,
9:193–202.
Lucas, R. E. (1976). The Phillips curve and labor markets, volume 1 of Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, chapter Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,
pages 19–46. American Elsevier, New York.
McDonald, I. M. and Solow, R. M. (1981). Wage bargaining and employment. American
Economic Review, 71(5):896–908.
Merterns, K. and Ravn, M. (2011). The dynamic effects of personal and corporate income
tax changes in the united states. Working Paper.
Miyagiwa, K. (1988). Corporate income tax incidence in the presence of sector-specific
unemployment. Journal of Public Economics, 37:103–12.
Nadja Dwenger, P. R. and Steiner, V. (2011). Sharing the burden: Empirical evidence
on corporate tax incidence. School of Business & Economics, Freie Universitt Berlin.
Discussion Paper: Economics, No. 2011/19.
Oakland, W. H. (1972). Corporate tax shifting in u.s. manufacturing, 1930-1968. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 54:235–44.
Office, C. B. (2007). Historical effective federal tax rates: 1979 to 2005. Technical report,
Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.
Ramey, V. A. (2009). Defense news shocks, 19392008: Estimates based on news sources.
unpublished, University of California SanDiego.
Ramey, V. A. (2011). Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the timing. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXXVI:1–50.
Ramey, V. A. and Shapiro, M. D. (1998). Costly capital reallocation and the effects of
government spending. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48:145–
94.
Randolph, W. C. (2006). International burdens of the corporate income tax. Working
Paper Series, Congressional Budget Office.
Rao, V. G. and Rao, K. S. H. (1971). The incidence of the corporate income tax in the
short run: The case of indican corporations. Public Finance, 26:586–606.
Rogers, D. L. (1996). The incidence of the corporate income tax. Congresional Budget
Office.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2009). A narrative analysis of postwar tax changes.
Available on-line.
83
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: Esti-
mates based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American Economic Review, 100:763–
801.
Roskamp, K. W. (1965). The shifting of taxes on business income: the case of west german
corporations. National Tax Journal, 18.
Sahni, B. S. and Mathew, T. (1976). The Shifting and Incidence of the Corporation
Income Tax. Rotterdam University Press, The Netherlands.
Sebold, F. D. (1979). The short-run shifting of the corporation income tax: A simultane-
ous equation approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 61(3):401–409.
Sims, C. and Zha, T. (1999). Error bands for impulse response functions. Econometrica,
67:1113–1155.
Sims, C. A. (1980). Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica, 48(1):1–48.
Slemrod, J. (1983). A general equilibrium model of taxation with endogenous financial be-
havior. In Feldstein, M., editor, Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis,
pages 427–58. Chicago University Press.
Slitor, R. (1966). Corporate tax incidence: Economic adjustments to differentials under
a two-tier tax structure. In Krzyzaniak, M., editor, Effects of Corporation Income Tax.
Wayne State University Press, Detroit.
Spencer, B. G. (1969). The shifting of the corporation income tax in canada. Canadian
Journal of Economics, 2(1):21–34.
Survey (2011). Mineral commodity summaries 2011. Technical report, U.S. Geological
Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior, Reston, Virginia.
Tsay, R. S. (2005). Analysis of Financial Time Series. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken,
New Jersey, second edition.
Valentinyi, A. and Herrendorf, B. (2008). Measuring factor income shares at the sectoral
level. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11:820–835.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2003). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Thomson:
South-Western, 2e edition.
84
APPENDIX C
Biography of the Author
Harold A. Va´squez-Ru´ız
(Born: Septermber 5th, 1979)
Email: email@haroldvasquez.com
Harold is originally from Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (D.R.). After graduat-
ing with a B.A. in Economics at the Technological Institute of Santo Domingo (INTEC),
he pursued a Master Degree in Finance at Carlos III University, Madrid, Spain (2002).
Afterwards, Harold returned to the D.R. to work as an economist at the Research
Department at the Central Bank of Dominican Republic (2002-2005), while concurrently
accepting a position as Assistant Professor of Economics at his alma mater, INTEC. He
taught courses in Introductory Economics, Macroeconomics, and Public Finance. During
his time at the Central Bank, the Dominican economy experienced one of its major
financial crises (2002-2004), which resulted in the establishment of a stand-by agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Throughout the financial crisis, Harold
worked for the team in charge of pursuing the stabilization policies and negotiating the
terms of the IMF agreement.
Harold came to Andrew Young School of Policy Studies (AYSPS), Georgia State Uni-
versity, for his Master Degree in Economics (2005) and joined the Ph.D. program in 2007.
While pursuing his doctorate, he worked as an intern at the Research Department of the
85
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (2006-2008), and also as a Research Assistant at the In-
ternational Studies Program of the AYSPS. He has won two Ph.D. awards at the AYSPS
for his outstanding achievements in economics: the Atlanta Economics Club Award and
the George Malanos Scholarship in Economics. He was chosen twice as VP for the Grad-
uate Student Association of Economics and he volunteered in different organizations in
Atlanta area, such as Operation Hope and Renovacion Conyugal. Currently, Harold is
Deputy Director of Research at the Central Bank of Dominican Republic, where his du-
ties involve the research, writing, and publishing of reports on the international economy.
His professional research interests are public finance, corporate taxation, international
finance, macroeconomics, econometrics, and time series analysis. Today, Harold lives in
Santo Domingo.
Last updated: April 19, 2012
86
